John Doe v. New York University

Background

John Doe, proceeding under a pseudonym, filed a proposed class action against New York University (NYU). He alleged that the student-run NYU Law Review used its statements of interest and optional résumés to favor women, non-Asian racial minorities, homosexual students, and transgender students in selecting new members. He asserted claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims for violations of federal rights by people acting under state law.

Doe alleged that he was a first-year law student, described himself as a heterosexual white man, and planned to apply to the Law Review. He claimed that he would face race and sex discrimination and would be denied an equal opportunity to compete. He also moved to certify a class. NYU moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Standing and Ripeness

The court granted the motion under Rule 12(b)(1) because Doe lacked standing and his claims were not constitutionally ripe. Standing requires an actual or imminent injury, a connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and a likelihood that a court decision would remedy the injury. Ripeness generally asks whether a dispute has developed enough for judicial review.

The court found that the alleged discrimination had not occurred and depended on several contingencies: Doe would have to apply; other students would have to disclose information about protected characteristics; editors would have to select students based on that information; and Doe would then have to fail to gain admission. The court found it speculative that applicants would disclose the relevant information and that editors would use it unlawfully. The complaint also did not identify specific discriminatory acts, statements, editors, or details about the alleged preferential treatment.

The court rejected Doe’s argument that he had already been denied an equal opportunity to compete. It explained that the precedent Doe relied on involved a government-created barrier, while the alleged policies here were implemented by the private, student-run Law Review. The court therefore concluded that Doe had not established an injury sufficient for federal jurisdiction.

Failure to State a Claim

The court added that, even if Doe had standing and his claims were ripe, the complaint failed under Rule 12(b)(6). For the Title VI and Title IX claims, the court found that Doe offered conclusory allegations rather than facts showing that NYU or the Law Review intentionally discriminated. The court noted that the revised selection policy did not identify a specific type of diversity and could refer to characteristics that were not legally protected classifications. The complaint did not explain how NYU participated in the Law Review’s daily operations or member-selection process, or how NYU knew of any alleged unlawful plans by unidentified editors.

The court also dismissed the Section 1983 claim. Section 1983 generally applies to conduct under color of state law, meaning conduct carried out through governmental authority or sufficiently connected to the state. The court found that the complaint did not allege that NYU acted jointly with the state or its agents through a plan, agreement, conspiracy, custom, or policy. The court also declined to treat Doe’s attempt to assert a new claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in his opposition brief as a proper amendment to the complaint.

Disposition

The court granted NYU’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and dismissed Doe’s complaint without prejudice. The court stated that Doe could commence a new lawsuit if his claims later became ripe, but made no finding that they would become ripe or that a future lawsuit would state a valid claim. Doe’s motion to certify the class was denied as moot, and the court directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motions and close the case.