Torres v. MMS Group LLC

Background

Elewood Torres alleged that he is legally deaf, uses a wheelchair, and experienced disability discrimination in housing at two buildings on Forsyth Street. He asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, the Fair Housing Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants named in the opinion include New York City Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), MMS Group LLC, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, housing-development entities, T.U.C. Management Company, Inc., and the New York Society for the Deaf.

HPD moved to dismiss the claims against it. Torres moved for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The court had already denied the temporary restraining order. Torres later withdrew his request for preliminary relief concerning the elevators, leaving requests for high-intensity strobe lights and bed shakers for fire alerts, and 24-hour security staff who could communicate effectively with deaf or hearing-impaired residents.

Preliminary Injunction

The court denied Torres’s motion for a preliminary injunction. To obtain that relief, Torres had to show, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits and a likelihood of irreparable harm without an injunction.

The court analyzed Torres’s failure-to-accommodate theory under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the state and city human-rights laws. The court stated that the relevant standards were substantially similar. The first two elements were not disputed: defendants conceded that Torres was a qualified individual with disabilities, and they did not contest that they received federal funding or were generally subject to the relevant statutes, except for HPD’s separate argument regarding its status.

The court found that Torres had not shown a likelihood of success on the required third element—being denied the opportunity to benefit from services, programs, or activities because of his disability. Regarding the fire alarm, defendants submitted evidence that strobe lights had been installed in every unit and common area more than ten years earlier. Torres acknowledged that the strobe lights existed but argued that they were insufficient. The court found that he had not timely submitted evidence supporting that assertion. The court also found that a flyer discussing bed shakers showed, at most, that such devices could be preferable; it did not establish that their absence created a legally recognized accessibility barrier.

Regarding security staff, Torres argued that guards could not communicate with him and requested guards fluent in American Sign Language or communication devices. Defendants submitted evidence that staff used written communication, notepads, pens, and emergency communication boards. At the hearing, Torres could not identify evidence of a particular emergency in which the staff’s communication tools had failed. The court viewed his evidence as broad complaints about the quality and number of guards, rather than proof that the alleged problems resulted from an inability to communicate with deaf or hearing-impaired residents. The court also noted that the Department of Housing and Urban Development had recently approved a second security guard.

The court separately found that Torres’s delay weighed against a finding of irreparable harm. The alleged conditions had existed for years, Torres waited more than a year after filing suit to seek a preliminary injunction, and he did not explain why that delay was consistent with a need for emergency relief. Because Torres failed to show likely success and irreparable harm, the court did not consider the remaining preliminary-injunction factors. The court also did not separately address the § 1983 claim because it was based on the same alleged deprivation underlying the disability-accommodation claims.

HPD’s Motion to Dismiss

The court granted HPD’s motion to dismiss. Torres’s claims against HPD were based on the allegation that HPD owned the buildings. HPD submitted deeds and land-disposition agreements showing that ownership had been conveyed to housing-development entities in 1992 and 2000.

Torres acknowledged that HPD had sold the buildings but argued that the agreements gave HPD and the City of New York a future possessory interest and a possibility that ownership could return if the agreements were breached. The court rejected that argument at the pleading stage. It found that the reverter provision was not automatic and required a written demand by the City. Torres had not alleged that such a demand occurred, and HPD denied that one had occurred. The agreements also stated that people who were not parties to them could not invoke the reverter provision. Therefore, even if the agreements had been violated, Torres could not use that alleged violation to establish HPD’s ownership.

Because HPD did not own the buildings, the court concluded that Torres could not maintain his claims against HPD. The court did not decide HPD’s separate argument that the buildings were not places of public accommodation under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court denied Torres leave to amend to replace HPD with the City of New York. It found that substituting the City would not cure the ownership problem because, if HPD did not own the buildings, the City did not own them either. The proposed amendment was therefore futile.

Judge Ho’s final order denied Torres’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted HPD’s motion to dismiss. The Clerk was directed to terminate HPD as a defendant. The opinion does not state a disposition of Torres’s claims against the other defendants.