Lopez v. Falco

Background

William Lopez, a former corrections officer employed by Rockland County, sued Sheriff Louis Falco and the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the defendants retaliated against him for exercising First Amendment speech and association rights, including his union activity and his 2015 support for a candidate who opposed Falco.

Lopez identified two alleged retaliatory actions. First, after an arbitration proceeding concerning his return to work, Falco allegedly placed him on absent-without-leave status, suspended his salary, and stopped further health-insurance contributions. Second, after Lopez’s employment was terminated under New York Civil Service Law § 71 because he could not return to work after work-related injuries, Falco allegedly denied him a retirement badge. Lopez sought damages, punitive damages against Falco individually, an order requiring Falco to provide the badge, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court considered the three grievance forms referenced in the complaint and took judicial notice of the existence of an arbitration award, but did not consider a declaration for which the defendants provided no basis for consideration at this stage.

Analysis

The court construed the complaint as asserting hybrid First Amendment speech-and-association retaliation claims. For a public-employee retaliation claim, the employee must plausibly allege protected speech or association, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the action.

Union grievances and association. The court held that Lopez’s three grievances and related arbitration demand did not concern matters of public concern. The grievances addressed his own sick leave, vacation time, work schedule, medical documentation, and personnel file. They were submitted through an internal workplace grievance process and sought remedies for Lopez’s personal employment issues. The court also held that Lopez’s general union-association allegations did not plausibly show that the defendants retaliated because of specific union activity involving a matter of public concern.

The court separately held that Lopez was speaking as an employee rather than as a private citizen when he filed the grievances. The grievances concerned his work schedule and attendance, which the court viewed as closely connected to his responsibilities as a corrections officer. The court therefore dismissed the retaliation claims to the extent they relied on those grievances and related union activity.

Support for an opposing candidate. The court recognized that supporting a candidate for public office is protected speech. However, it held that Lopez could not plausibly connect that 2015 activity to the later decisions to place him on absent-without-leave status and suspend his pay and health-insurance contributions. Those actions occurred at least seven years later. The court also found that Lopez’s allegations that Falco mistreated approximately seven other union leaders lacked enough detail to show that those individuals were similarly situated or that their treatment demonstrated retaliatory motive.

Retirement badge. The court dismissed the claim based on denial of the retirement badge because the complaint did not explain what the badge was, why Lopez wanted it, or why he was entitled to it. Without those facts, the court could not determine whether denying the badge would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights or was only a minor action.

The defendants did not argue that placing Lopez on absent-without-leave status and suspending his pay and health-insurance contributions were not adverse actions. The court noted that reductions in pay and failures to process insurance-related benefits can qualify as adverse employment actions. But the court found that Lopez still failed to plausibly allege the required causal connection. The court also noted that Lopez conceded his termination was based on his inability to return to work after his injuries, rather than retaliation.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because this was the first adjudication of Lopez’s claims, the court dismissed them without prejudice. Lopez was allowed 30 days from the date of the opinion to file an amended complaint containing all claims, defendants, and factual allegations he wished the court to consider. The court stated that if he did not timely amend, the dismissed claims might be dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion.