L.S. v. Kijakazi

Background

L.S. sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s denial of his application for supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that L.S. had several severe mental-health and substance-use impairments. Considering all of those impairments together, the administrative law judge found that L.S. met the criteria for disability under the agency’s listings for schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and depressive disorders.

The administrative law judge then applied the required two-stage analysis for drug addiction and alcoholism. At the second stage, the judge considered whether L.S. would still be disabled if he stopped using drugs and alcohol. The judge found that L.S. would have no more than moderate mental limitations without substance use, could perform a range of work with restrictions, and could perform jobs such as garment bagger, sorter, and rack loader. The judge therefore concluded that L.S. was not disabled during the relevant period because substance use was a contributing factor material to the disability determination.

L.S. challenged the administrative law judge’s treatment of the evidence, including the analysis of substance-use materiality, the development of the record, medical findings and Dr. Laura Jean Catlin’s opinion, L.S.’s testimony, and the residual functional capacity assessment. The Commissioner defended the administrative decision.

Court’s analysis

Development of the record. The court rejected L.S.’s argument that the administrative law judge failed to develop the record by not adequately investigating the nature and extent of his substance use. The court concluded that L.S. had not shown that the record was ambiguous or inadequate in a way that triggered a duty to conduct further inquiry. On this issue, the court denied L.S.’s summary-judgment motion and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion.

Drug-and-alcohol materiality. The court held that the administrative law judge’s conclusion that substance use was material was not supported by substantial evidence. The judge had relied on records from L.S.’s 2019–2020 parole period and his 2020–2021 incarceration period as evidence of how he functioned without substance use, and had treated his suicide attempts in December 2021 and January 2022 as the only periods of marked or extreme limitation associated with active substance use.

The court found that records from the parole period documented stimulant use, making that period an uncertain comparison for determining how L.S. functioned without substance use. The court also found that the incarceration period was not a reliable measure of the effects of sobriety alone because it involved a highly structured setting and medication compliance. The administrative law judge did not adequately separate the effects of that setting and treatment from the effects of presumed abstinence.

The court therefore concluded that the record and the administrative law judge’s analysis did not show that the earlier periods represented L.S.’s functioning without drugs and alcohol or outside a highly structured environment. On this issue, the court granted L.S.’s summary-judgment motion and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion.

Medical findings and Dr. Catlin’s opinion. The court found no error in the administrative law judge’s interpretation of Dr. Catlin’s diagnoses and findings concerning remission of substance use. But the court held that the administrative law judge’s decision to credit the state-agency medical findings and discount Dr. Catlin’s opinion was based on the same unsupported premise about when L.S. was using substances. Because that premise was not supported by substantial evidence, the related evaluation of the medical evidence was also unsupported. The court granted L.S.’s motion and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion on this issue.

L.S.’s testimony. The court held that the administrative law judge did not provide legally sufficient reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting L.S.’s statements about the limiting effects of his impairments. The judge had relied partly on relatively normal findings during the parole and incarceration periods, but the court concluded that those periods were not adequately assessed in light of the suicide attempts and the uncertainty about substance use and structured conditions.

The court also held that the administrative law judge improperly relied on L.S.’s work history without considering evidence that he held jobs only briefly and testified that paranoia, oversleeping, and missed communications contributed to losing jobs. The court further found it unclear whether the judge properly considered L.S.’s unstable housing, limited access to treatment, and reliance on the criminal-justice system for treatment when evaluating his limited treatment history. The court granted L.S.’s motion and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion on this issue.

Residual functional capacity. A residual functional capacity is the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. The court did not find that L.S. adequately explained why the administrative law judge’s restrictions for simple, routine, repetitive work failed to account for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. However, the court found it unclear whether the judge properly considered the vocational expert’s testimony that being off-task for 20 percent of the workday would eliminate all work. Because the drug-and-alcohol analysis and evaluation of the other evidence were unsupported, those errors could affect the residual functional capacity and the vocational evidence on remand. The court granted L.S.’s motion and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion on this issue.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part L.S.’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order. The court stated that the remand was not intended to limit its scope. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file. The court did not award benefits in this order.