C.D. v. Kijakazi

Background

C.D. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits. He alleged disability based on post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, traumatic brain injury, hip pain, and a finger fracture. The administrative law judge found that C.D. had severe post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and traumatic brain injury, but concluded that he was not disabled because he could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

C.D. moved for summary judgment, asking the court to reverse the administrative decision and remand for payment of benefits. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The court reviewed whether the administrative decision was supported by substantial evidence—relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate—and whether the administrative law judge applied proper legal standards.

Medical opinions

The administrative law judge found the opinions of C.D.’s treating providers, Robert Cleveland and Jerry Boriskin, not persuasive. Those providers described significant limitations caused by C.D.’s post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental impairments.

The court held that the reasons given for rejecting both opinions were not supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge relied on selected observations, such as C.D.’s being cooperative, oriented, reading, exercising, and spending time with his family, without adequately considering other evidence of serious symptoms. The court said the administrative law judge improperly selected favorable portions of the record while overlooking evidence supporting the providers’ opinions. The court also concluded that, after rejecting all medical opinions about C.D.’s mental impairments, the administrative law judge improperly substituted her own interpretation of the treatment records for medical opinions.

The court separately found that the administrative law judge’s treatment of the state-agency consultant’s opinion about C.D.’s physical impairments was supported by substantial evidence. That consultant had found the physical impairments non-severe, but the administrative law judge found the opinion inconsistent with evidence of C.D.’s traumatic brain injury symptoms.

Department of Veterans Affairs rating

C.D. argued that the administrative law judge erred by failing to consider his 100% Department of Veterans Affairs disability rating. The court rejected this argument. It explained that revised Social Security regulations applicable to C.D.’s application provide that decisions by other government agencies about whether a person is disabled or entitled to benefits are neither valuable nor persuasive, and the Social Security decision need not analyze those decisions.

C.D.’s testimony about symptoms

The court also held that the administrative law judge did not provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting C.D.’s testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms. The administrative law judge relied on C.D.’s plans to teach courses and write a novel, his involvement in a kitchen remodel, childcare, reports of improved symptoms, mental-status examinations, medication effectiveness, daily activities, and his ability to provide information during the hearing.

The court found these reasons inadequate. Plans to become more active did not conflict with C.D.’s reported limitations. The record lacked enough information about the kitchen remodeling to show that it conflicted with his testimony. Caring for children and performing household activities did not establish an ability to work full time. The administrative law judge also failed to consider reports of improvement in the context of C.D.’s overall mental-health history and relied on selected positive observations while overlooking continuing symptoms. The court further found that evidence showing medication benefits was not inconsistent with C.D.’s testimony about significant side effects. Finally, because the hearing was conducted by telephone, the administrative law judge could not rely on C.D.’s appearance as observed at the hearing.

Listed impairment and work-capacity assessment

The court concluded that the errors in evaluating the treating providers’ opinions and C.D.’s testimony affected the administrative law judge’s analysis of whether C.D.’s impairments met or medically equaled Listing 12.15 for trauma- and stressor-related disorders. The same errors affected the residual functional capacity finding, which is the assessment of the most a person can still do despite their impairments. The court found that the residual functional capacity did not reflect all of the limitations described by C.D.

Disposition

The court found that the requirements for ordering immediate payment of benefits were not satisfied because a proper evaluation of the evidence and additional determinations were still required. It therefore ordered further proceedings rather than payment of benefits. The administrative law judge must reconsider: (1) the persuasiveness of Cleveland’s and Boriskin’s opinions; (2) C.D.’s subjective testimony; (3) whether C.D.’s impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment; and (4) C.D.’s residual functional capacity. The court also stated that the administrative law judge may consider whether further development of the record is warranted.

Judge Virginia K. Demarchi granted C.D.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the order. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the case.