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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Mar. 31, 2024

E.P. v. Kijakazi

Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Docket
5:22-cv-05830
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
24
Social SecuritySummary Judgment
In one sentence

In E.P. v. Kijakazi, Judge DeMarchi remanded after finding errors in evaluating medical opinions and E.P.’s mental-health allegations.

Who this affects

E.P.’s claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits was sent back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. The Commissioner’s denial was not left in place as the final resolution of the claim.

What happened

E.P. asked the court to review the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying her disability insurance benefits. She argued that the administrative law judge mishandled medical opinions, her reports about mental-health symptoms, and the finding that she could return to past work.

The court found no error in the evaluation of Dr. D. Gross’s opinion, but found that the administrative law judge did not adequately evaluate opinions from Dr. Kathleen Akiyama and Dr. Caroline Salvador-Moses. The court also found that the evaluation of E.P.’s reports about her symptoms was tied to those errors. E.P. had waived her argument that her dry-cleaner-helper job was not past relevant work, and the court did not decide her remaining past-work arguments.

Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi granted in part and denied in part both parties’ summary-judgment motions and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. The administrative law judge must reconsider the two medical opinions, E.P.’s testimony about her symptoms, and any related issues.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
E.P. v. Kijakazi · No. 5:22-cv-05830
Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Date
Mar. 31, 2024

Background

E.P. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. She alleged disability beginning August 31, 2018, based on major depression with anxiety, congestive heart failure, stroke, and liver disease. The administrative law judge found severe impairments including a mental impairment diagnosed to include major depressive disorder with anxiety, dysthymia, and alcohol use disorder; cardiomyopathy; and chronic liver disease secondary to alcohol abuse. The administrative law judge determined that E.P. could perform light work with restrictions, including simple, routine tasks, simple work-related decisions, occasional interaction with the public, and no work around unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts. The administrative law judge concluded that E.P. could perform her past relevant work as a dry cleaner helper and animal caretaker and was not disabled from August 31, 2018, through June 30, 2021.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. E.P. challenged the evaluation of medical opinions, the reasons given for discounting her allegations about mental dysfunction, and the finding that she could perform her past relevant work.

Medical opinions

The court found no error in the administrative law judge’s treatment of state-agency psychologist D. Gross’s opinion. Although Dr. Gross identified moderate limitations in several areas, the administrative law judge limited E.P. to simple, routine work, simple work-related decisions, occasional public interaction, and work better involving things than people. The court concluded that these restrictions adequately accounted for the limitations involving supervisors and coworkers.

The court held that the reasons for discounting treating psychiatrist Kathleen Akiyama’s opinion were not supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge incorrectly stated when Dr. Akiyama issued her opinion and relied on generally normal mental-status examinations, periods of improvement, daily activities, and the state-agency opinions. The court explained that the record had to be viewed as a whole because E.P.’s symptoms improved at some times but worsened or showed setbacks at others. The administrative law judge did not sufficiently explain why E.P.’s limited activities were inconsistent with Dr. Akiyama’s opinion. The court also could not determine that the date error was harmless.

The court likewise found errors in the treatment of consulting psychologist Caroline Salvador-Moses’s opinion. The administrative law judge credited the opinion as to moderate limitations but did not adequately account for the moderate limitation involving attendance and safety in usual work situations. The court also found that the administrative law judge did not provide sufficient evidence-based reasons for rejecting the opinion’s marked limitations involving pace, persistence, adapting to routine workplace changes, and interacting with supervisors and coworkers. The administrative law judge did not sufficiently explain why E.P.’s reported activities were inconsistent with those limitations. Because the opinion was supported by the examiner’s own findings and was being compared with other opinions, the administrative law judge also needed to explain consideration of factors such as the treatment relationship and specialization.

E.P.’s symptom allegations

The court reviewed the administrative law judge’s finding that E.P.’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the record. The administrative law judge relied on later improvement in E.P.’s symptoms and activities such as personal care, simple meals, household chores, public transportation, walking her dog, grocery shopping, gardening, social-media use, and visiting family.

The court concluded that to the extent this evaluation depended on the administrative law judge’s erroneous assessment of the medical evidence, the symptom evaluation was also affected. The court therefore granted E.P.’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this portion of the case.

Past relevant work

E.P. argued that the dry-cleaner-helper job was not past relevant work because it did not constitute substantial gainful activity. The Commissioner argued that E.P. had waived that argument because her attorney stated at the administrative hearing that he had no objections to the administrative law judge’s finding that the job was past relevant work. The court found that E.P. had waived the argument in this appeal.

The court did not address E.P.’s remaining arguments about past relevant work because further administrative proceedings could affect the residual functional capacity determination.

Disposition

The court concluded that the administrative law judge erred in evaluating Dr. Akiyama’s opinion, Dr. Salvador-Moses’s opinion, and E.P.’s statements about the limiting effects of her symptoms. Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi granted in part and denied in part E.P.’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order. On remand, the administrative law judge must reconsider the persuasiveness of the two medical opinions, E.P.’s subjective testimony, and any further proceedings that are necessary. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file.

The authoritative version

Read the full 24-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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