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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Mar. 25, 2024

A.T. v. Kijakazi

Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Docket
5:22-cv-07189
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
17
Social SecuritySummary Judgment
In one sentence

In A.T. v. O’Malley, Judge Demarchi granted A.T.’s summary-judgment motion, denied the Commissioner’s, and remanded her Social Security case for further proceedings.

Who this affects

A.T. and the Commissioner of Social Security. The case returns to the administrative law judge, who must reconsider the medical opinions, A.T.’s statements about her symptoms, and her residual functional capacity.

What happened

In A.T. v. O’Malley, A.T. challenged the denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that she was not disabled and could perform other work despite her mental-health conditions.

The court found that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated opinions from A.T.’s treating providers and improperly discounted her statements about her symptoms. The judge relied too heavily on isolated signs of improvement and did not consider the record as a whole, including evidence that her symptoms worsened or continued.

Judge Demarchi granted A.T.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and sent the case back for further proceedings. The administrative law judge must reconsider the medical opinions, A.T.’s statements, and her ability to work; the court did not order an immediate benefits award.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
A.T. v. Kijakazi · No. 5:22-cv-07189
Judge
Virginia Demarchi
Date
Mar. 25, 2024

Background

A.T. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income under Title XVI. She alleged disability beginning November 13, 2018, based on post-traumatic stress disorder with panic attacks, agoraphobia, anxiety, major depressive disorder, insomnia, and migraines.

The administrative law judge found that A.T. had severe impairments including bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, unspecified anxiety disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and cannabis abuse. The administrative law judge determined that she could perform work at all exertional levels, subject to restrictions such as simple, routine, repetitive tasks; no public contact; only occasional contact with supervisors; isolation from coworkers; and low-stress work. Based on that residual functional capacity, the administrative law judge found that A.T. could not perform her past work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The Appeals Council denied review.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to decide whether the administrative decision was supported by substantial evidence and used proper legal standards.

Medical Opinions

The court held that the administrative law judge did not adequately support the decision to find the opinions of physician assistants Carrie Whiting and Emily Caveza unpersuasive. Those providers treated A.T. regularly and described significant mental-health symptoms and marked limitations in multiple work-related areas. They also estimated that A.T. would miss work more than three times per month because of her impairments or treatment.

The administrative law judge relied on records showing some improvement with medication, normal mental-status findings, and reports of good concentration, judgment, insight, and logical thought processes. The court found that this reasoning was not supported by substantial evidence because the record, viewed as a whole, also showed worsening symptoms, medication problems, continued anxiety and depression, severe questionnaire scores, suicidal ideation, and difficulty functioning.

The court concluded that the administrative law judge improperly selected favorable treatment notes without adequately considering evidence pointing the other way. It also found that the administrative law judge misinterpreted Whiting’s 2019 opinion: an assessment that A.T.’s capacity was “fair” meant that her capacity was impaired and needed further description; it did not mean that she had no impairment.

The court rejected A.T.’s challenge to the administrative law judge’s reliance on two state-agency psychological consultants. The court held that the consultants could consider expected future functioning because the disability programs include a requirement that an impairment last, or be expected to last, at least 12 months. The court also rejected A.T.’s argument that opinions from consultants who did not examine her could not constitute substantial evidence by themselves under the applicable regulations.

A.T.’s Statements About Her Symptoms

The court held that the administrative law judge did not give legally sufficient reasons for discounting A.T.’s statements about the intensity and effects of her symptoms. The administrative law judge characterized the record as showing that A.T.’s symptoms generally improved and stabilized with treatment.

The court found that conclusion unsupported because the cited improvements did not establish a broader pattern. The record also included reports of severe or worsening depression and anxiety, suicidal ideation, medication difficulties, persistent sadness and anxiety, and more than 20 panic attacks during the month before the hearing. The court concluded that the administrative law judge failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting A.T.’s symptom statements.

Residual Functional Capacity

A residual functional capacity is the most a person can still do despite her impairments. The court held that the administrative law judge’s residual-functional-capacity finding was not supported by substantial evidence because it rested on the errors in evaluating the treating providers’ opinions and A.T.’s statements. The administrative law judge incorporated some limitations but did not fully account for the limitations described by A.T. and her providers.

Disposition

The court denied A.T.’s request for an immediate award of benefits because a final disability determination could not be made without properly reassessing the medical opinions and testimony. It therefore remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The court granted A.T.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the order. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file.

The authoritative version

Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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