Rivera v. East Bay Municipal Utilities District

Background

Ivette Rivera, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the East Bay Municipal Utilities District (EBMUD) and sixteen individual EBMUD directors and employees. She alleged retaliation and sex-based discrimination under federal and California law, civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and declaratory or injunctive relief.

Rivera alleged that her performance ratings declined after she sued EBMUD in 2015 and that, between April 2021 and December 2023, various events occurred involving overtime, an administrative appeal, a proposed performance plan, public board meetings, mediation, and a performance appraisal given to a male subordinate. EBMUD and the individual defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a plausible legal claim.

Claims Against EBMUD

The court dismissed Counts I and IV, which asserted claims under § 1983. Count I sought to hold EBMUD responsible for employees’ alleged unlawful acts. Because a municipal entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability, Count I was dismissed with prejudice as to EBMUD. “With prejudice” means that claim cannot be refiled in this case.

Count IV asserted Monell-related claims. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a municipal entity may be liable under § 1983 when an injury results from a government policy or custom. The court found that Rivera’s allegations about EBMUD policies, practices, and ratification were conclusory and speculative and did not plausibly identify a policy or custom connected to her alleged injuries. Count IV was dismissed as to EBMUD, with leave to amend.

Counts II and III asserted conspiracy claims under §§ 1985 and 1986. The court found no specific allegations of an agreement or other non-speculative facts supporting a conspiracy. Because a § 1986 claim depends on a valid § 1985 claim, both counts were dismissed without prejudice as to EBMUD. “Without prejudice” means the claim may be refiled or amended, subject to the order’s requirements.

Counts V and VI alleged sex-based discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. For the discrimination claim, the court found that Rivera did not allege enough facts showing that the men who received more overtime were similarly situated to her in all material respects or that other circumstances plausibly indicated sex discrimination.

For the retaliation claim, the court found that Rivera did not plausibly allege protected activity under Title VII or the state law. The complaint did not provide enough information about her earlier lawsuit or her comments at EBMUD board meetings to show that she opposed discriminatory practices. The court also found no adequate allegation of a causal connection between the denial of an extension to appeal and any protected activity. The remaining allegations of retaliation were considered conclusory. Counts V and VI were dismissed as to EBMUD, with leave to amend.

The court also concluded that Rivera’s request for declaratory relief appeared to seek an injunction. An injunction is a remedy rather than a separate cause of action, and the request could not be sustained because Rivera had not plausibly stated a claim against EBMUD. This remaining claim was dismissed with leave to amend.

Claims Against the Individual Defendants

Counts I and IV were dismissed as to all individual defendants. Count IV was dismissed with prejudice because Monell is a theory of liability for municipal entities, not individual defendants. Count I was dismissed because the complaint did not identify concrete actions by the individual defendants that violated Rivera’s rights. The court’s conclusion allowed the remaining claims to be amended, so Count I as to the individual defendants was not included among the claims dismissed with prejudice in the conclusion.

The court found that the allegations concerning the EBMUD board directors mainly identified who they were and made general assertions about their authority and ratification of actions. The complaint did not connect specific conduct by those individuals to the alleged wrongdoing. As to the other individual defendants, the complaint generally referred to “Defendants” without identifying which allegations supported which claim against which person. Rivera also did not meaningfully oppose the individual defendants’ motion.

Counts II and III were dismissed without prejudice as to the individual defendants because the complaint did not plausibly allege a conspiracy under § 1985, and the absence of a valid § 1985 claim defeated the § 1986 claim. Counts V and VI were dismissed with prejudice as to all individual defendants because employees and supervisors cannot be held individually liable under the cited Title VII and California discrimination laws. The request for declaratory or injunctive relief against the individual defendants was dismissed for the same reasons discussed for EBMUD.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Specifically, Count I was dismissed with prejudice as to EBMUD; Count IV was dismissed with prejudice as to the individual defendants; and Counts V and VI were dismissed with prejudice as to the individual defendants. The remaining claims as to all defendants were dismissed with leave to amend. Rivera could file an amended complaint consistent with the order by March 21, 2025. The court prohibited adding new parties or claims without prior permission and stated that failure to meet the deadline or follow the order would result in dismissal of the case under Rule 41(b).