Warmington v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, The

Background

Joanna Warmington was the head coach of the women’s cross country and track and field teams at the University of Minnesota Duluth beginning in 2009. She alleged that the University treated her and her teams differently from other coaches and teams, including by providing less funding and support and by limiting her coaching practices. She also alleged that she was paid less than the men’s coach until the pay disparity was corrected in 2016.

Warmington alleged that she experienced sex- and gender-based harassment, including vulgar comments, sex-based stereotypes, remarks about her appearance, and conduct involving male coaches and athletes. The University placed her on administrative leave after student athletes complained that she created an unwanted sexual atmosphere and had inappropriate discussions about eating habits and weight. After an investigation, the University notified Warmington that termination was appropriate but offered her the opportunity to resign instead. Warmington resigned but did not sign the proposed settlement agreement and release.

Warmington brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX, and the Equal Pay Act. She also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which she conceded should be dismissed. The University moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly states a legal claim.

Title VII Discrimination Claim

The court concluded that Warmington plausibly alleged that she was qualified and experienced an adverse employment action. The court accepted that her resignation under notice of imminent termination could plausibly constitute a constructive discharge, meaning a resignation that is treated as a termination because the circumstances reasonably compelled the employee to resign.

The court nevertheless held that Warmington did not plausibly allege that sex discrimination was a motivating factor in the University’s decision to end her employment. Her allegations showed that her women’s teams received adverse treatment compared with other University teams and that she advocated for better treatment of her athletes. But the complaint did not connect those facts to discrimination against Warmington because she was a woman. The court also found that allegations challenging the investigation did not, by themselves, show that discrimination was the real reason for the termination.

Title VII Hostile-Work-Environment Claim

The court held that Warmington did not plausibly plead a hostile-work-environment claim. Although some alleged remarks were offensive and related to sex or gender, the complaint did not identify when or how often the remarks occurred during her approximately ten years at the University. The court also found that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the University knew or should have known about the incidents and failed to take appropriate action.

The court determined that other allegations—such as unequal resources, exclusion from event setup, other coaches’ conduct, and the handling of unrelated incidents—did not sufficiently show that Warmington’s workplace was permeated by severe or pervasive discriminatory harassment.

Title IX Claims

The complaint contained two Title IX counts, but the court found their theories unclear because the counts used identical allegations and referred generally to retaliation, sex discrimination, and sexual harassment. Based on Warmington’s briefing, the court understood her to be pursuing a Title IX retaliation claim based on her advocacy for equal treatment of her teams and athletes.

The court held that Warmington plausibly alleged protected activity and a materially adverse action. But she did not plausibly allege the required but-for causal connection between her protected activity and her termination. Her assertions that the University wanted to end her employment because she advocated for equality were conclusory. The complaint did not identify direct or indirect evidence showing that her protected activity was a determinative cause of the termination.

Equal Pay Act Claim

The court dismissed Warmington’s Equal Pay Act claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint alleged that the pay disparity was corrected in 2016, while Warmington filed the action on October 23, 2019. Because she did not allege a willful violation, the applicable limitations period was two years. The court also rejected her argument that the period was extended because of the University’s handling of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigation, explaining that filing an administrative charge does not toll the Equal Pay Act limitations period.

Disposition

At the hearing, Warmington’s counsel declined the opportunity to amend and stated that Warmington would stand on the original complaint. Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted the Board of Regents’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court ordered that judgment be entered.