Cornejo v. Tumlin

Background

The lawsuit concerned the towing and continued storage of Marimar Cornejo and Jamil Bey’s 1998 Toyota Camry. On February 27, 2020, the plaintiffs parked near Ellis Street and Powell Street in San Francisco. The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency ticketed the vehicle after 8:00 p.m., and Nelsons Tow towed it at the agency’s direction at about 9:00 p.m. The vehicle was in a construction zone covered by a permit for a “No Stopping” area between 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. The parties disputed whether the signs were posted when the plaintiffs parked, but agreed that the signs were posted when the vehicle was towed.

The AutoReturn defendants stored the vehicle. The plaintiffs alleged that the tow and storage violated the Fourth and Eighth Amendments through claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute allowing claims for constitutional violations committed under color of state law. The remaining claims were a Fourth Amendment claim against the AutoReturn defendants; an Eighth Amendment claim against those defendants; an Eighth Amendment claim against the City and County of San Francisco and Jeffrey Tumlin; and a Fourth Amendment claim against Tumlin.

Motions and Legal Standard

The City defendants and AutoReturn defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. Summary judgment is a decision entered without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The plaintiffs opposed the AutoReturn defendants’ motion on the Fourth Amendment claim, arguing that the dispute about when the signs were posted required a trial. They also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim and sought judgment against Tumlin on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Eighth Amendment Claim Against the City Defendants

The plaintiffs claimed that the towing and storage charges were excessive fines. The court applied the constitutional rule against punitive fines that are grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the underlying offense. It held that the $4,380.50 amount currently claimed was not grossly disproportionate. The court found that the plaintiffs violated San Francisco Transportation Code section 7.2.46 by remaining parked in the construction zone after 7:00 p.m., although it characterized the violation as minor. It also considered that the plaintiffs did not pursue an administrative process that could have stopped or reduced the accumulation of storage fees and did not provide proof of vehicle registration, which was required for release of the vehicle.

The court found that the $4,380.50 charge was connected to actual towing, transfer, administrative, lien, and storage costs, and that the city had a public-safety interest in keeping construction zones and streets clear. The court therefore granted the City defendants summary judgment on the ground that this amount did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

The court separately considered the $23,340.50 balance that had appeared on AutoReturn’s website. It assumed, without deciding, that this higher amount could be excessive. It nevertheless held that the plaintiffs had not shown that the City and County of San Francisco had a policy, custom, or practice of imposing excessive fines, as required for municipal liability under § 1983. The evidence showed at most that AutoReturn’s website had incorrectly failed to account for the 60-day limit on storage fees. The court granted summary judgment to the City and County of San Francisco on this claim.

The court also granted summary judgment to Tumlin on the Eighth Amendment claim. The plaintiffs did not provide evidence of Tumlin’s personal participation in the alleged violation or a sufficient causal connection between his conduct and the violation. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and speculation as insufficient evidence.

Fourth Amendment Claim Against Tumlin

The court granted Tumlin summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim for the same reason: the plaintiffs had not established his liability under § 1983.

Fourth Amendment Claim Against the AutoReturn Defendants

The AutoReturn defendants argued that they were protected by a good-faith defense and that the tow was permitted under the community-caretaking doctrine. A good-faith defense can protect a private party sued under § 1983 when the party reasonably and subjectively believed its conduct was lawful. The court held that the AutoReturn defendants acted in good faith because they followed the SFMTA’s tow request and tow slip, the vehicle was in a visible construction zone with “No Stopping” signs when they arrived, and they had no reason to suspect that the tow violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

The court also held that the disputed condition of the signs when the plaintiffs parked was immaterial to the AutoReturn defendants’ good-faith defense. The court concluded that the AutoReturn defendants also acted in good faith when storing the vehicle because they were required to follow the contract with the City and California law, which prohibited release without proof of current registration. The court further held that the seizure was permissible under the community-caretaking doctrine because the vehicle was in an active construction zone and created an impediment to traffic and a threat to public safety. It granted the AutoReturn defendants summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Eighth Amendment Claim Against the AutoReturn Defendants

The AutoReturn defendants argued that they acted in good faith regarding the fees. The court agreed and granted them summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim. The court found that they acted under their contract with the City, passed through fees set by the City, had no reason to question the fees’ legality or constitutionality, and never charged or collected the $23,340.50 amount shown on the website. The plaintiffs offered no evidence creating a genuine dispute about the defendants’ good faith.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that it granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to all claims and denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment.