Doe v. Kristi L. Noem

Background

John Doe, a United States citizen originally from Afghanistan, alleged that the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) violated the Administrative Procedure Act by denying 27 humanitarian-parole applications filed for family members who remained in Afghanistan. The opinion states that Doe’s family members faced risks connected to their support for the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan and their ethnic and religious affiliations.

USCIS initially denied the applications in 2022 using identical form letters. After Doe filed this lawsuit, USCIS reopened the applications and issued requests for evidence for all but one of them. USCIS then denied all 27 applications again with identical, generic letters that made no specific findings or individualized explanations.

The amended complaint originally asserted claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. Doe voluntarily dismissed the procedural due-process claim, leaving only the Administrative Procedure Act claim. The Secretary of State was previously dismissed because Doe had not plausibly alleged that the Secretary caused his injury. The court also previously dismissed claims based on the first round of denials as moot, while allowing the claims concerning the second round of denials to proceed.

Motion and Legal Standards

The remaining defendants—the USCIS Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security—moved for judgment on the pleadings. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the court applies the same basic standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At this stage, the court accepts well-pleaded facts as true and draws reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party.

The defendants argued that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability barred judicial review, that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege an Administrative Procedure Act violation, and that Doe lacked a private cause of action to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

Consular Nonreviewability

The court explained that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability generally limits judicial review of decisions about admitting or excluding foreign nationals. But the court distinguished between reviewing the ultimate discretionary decision to deny parole and reviewing the separate, nondiscretionary question of whether USCIS performed the required case-by-case review.

Because Doe was no longer asserting a constitutional violation, one earlier reason for declining to apply the doctrine no longer applied. The court nevertheless held that the second reason remained valid: the doctrine did not prevent the court from deciding whether USCIS complied with the statutory requirement to evaluate the applications individually.

Administrative Procedure Act Claim

The court held that the amended complaint plausibly stated an Administrative Procedure Act claim. The complaint alleged that the humanitarian-parole statute requires case-by-case review and that USCIS policies require officers to consider the totality of the circumstances and follow specified procedures.

The court acknowledged that boilerplate language alone does not necessarily prove that an agency failed to conduct an individualized review. But Doe alleged that USCIS issued identical generic denials for all 27 applications, provided no specific findings, and gave no individualized explanations. Taking those allegations and reasonable inferences in Doe’s favor, the court found the claim sufficient to proceed. The court stated that further discovery could clarify whether USCIS actually complied with the case-by-case requirement.

Private Cause of Action and Standing

The defendants argued that a provision added by the Laken Riley Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(C), allowed only state attorneys general to challenge violations of the case-by-case parole requirement. The court rejected that interpretation. It concluded that the provision authorizes suits by state attorneys general but does not state that such suits are the only way to challenge agency action under the parole statute.

The court therefore held that Doe had a private cause of action to enforce the case-by-case requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and had standing to pursue the remaining claim.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. It held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not foreclose review of the second round of parole denials, that the amended complaint plausibly alleged an Administrative Procedure Act claim, and that the statutory provision concerning suits by state attorneys general did not bar Doe’s action.