Rice v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Allison Barton Rice sued the City and County of San Francisco and other city officials. He alleged that the city’s refusal to permit a rent-paying roommate in his below-market-rate condominium, and its warning that it might enforce its no-leasing policy, violated the Fair Housing Act.

A jury returned a verdict for the defendants in June 2023. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment in June 2026. Rice then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3) to vacate the judgment. He argued that his attorney committed gross negligence by narrowing his claim under the Fair Housing Act without his approval, failing to introduce the city’s Inclusionary Affordable Housing Program Monitoring and Procedures Manual into evidence despite his instructions, and persuading him not to alert the court to an unpublished Ninth Circuit memorandum that he believed was relevant.

Rule 60(b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision allowing relief from a judgment for another reason that justifies relief. The court explained that a party must show both injury and circumstances beyond the party’s control that prevented proper participation in the case. The rule is used sparingly and requires extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.

The court treated Rice’s three allegations as strategic decisions by his attorneys. It held that disagreements about jury instructions, evidence, and legal authority were not extraordinary circumstances warranting relief. The court also rejected Rice’s reliance on a prior decision involving gross negligence because the conduct described in that decision involved an attorney abandoning the client, which the court found different from Rice’s alleged disagreements with counsel.

Rule 60(d)(3)

Rule 60(d)(3) preserves the court’s power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. The court explained that this requires clear and convincing evidence of fraud that harms the integrity of the judicial process, goes to a central issue, affects the outcome, and was not known at the time of settlement or entry of judgment.

The court found that Rice had shown, at most, nondisclosure of evidence or other fraud connected with presenting the case. It also stated that, to the extent Rice claimed he was unaware of the issues when judgment was entered, he should have been aware of them because a client is ordinarily responsible for the negligent acts and known facts of the client’s lawyer-agent.

Disposition

Judge Laurel Beeler denied the motion to vacate the judgment. The order states that it resolves ECF No. 288.