Samuels v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Michael Samuels sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that Samuels had severe emphysema, coronary artery disease, affective disorders, and schizophrenia, but determined that he could perform light work with limits on exposure to respiratory irritants and restrictions to simple, routine, unskilled tasks. Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, commonly called the grids, the administrative law judge found that jobs existed in significant numbers that Samuels could perform.

Samuels challenged the decision on five grounds: the treatment of opinions from his treating psychiatrist, William Mains, M.D., and consultative psychologist, Faith Tobias, Ph.D.; the evaluation of his testimony; the residual functional capacity assessment; the use of the grids without vocational-expert testimony; and the administrative law judge’s appointment under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.

Appointments Clause challenge

The court denied Samuels’s motion for summary judgment on the appointment challenge and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment on that issue. The court did not decide whether Social Security administrative law judges are officers covered by the Appointments Clause. Instead, it found that Samuels had not presented facts or evidence showing that Administrative Law Judge David Mazzi was improperly appointed. The court also noted that Samuels had not raised the challenge during the administrative proceedings and had not adequately addressed the Commissioner’s argument that the challenge was forfeited.

Medical opinions and residual functional capacity

The court held that the administrative law judge did not give sufficient reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Mains’s opinion. Dr. Mains diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and opined that Samuels’s mental impairments were disabling even without drug or alcohol use. The court found that the administrative law judge failed to adequately address the required factors governing the evaluation of a treating physician’s opinion, including the treatment relationship, examination frequency, nature and extent of treatment, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

The court also found that the administrative law judge relied too narrowly on evidence that Samuels’s symptoms sometimes improved with medication or in structured settings. The judge did not adequately consider the support Samuels received from sober living arrangements, his mother and other relatives, and treatment services, or how the loss of that support might affect his ability to function.

The court separately held that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain whether he accepted or rejected Dr. Tobias’s findings of moderate limitations in handling the stress of a routine workday and maintaining emotional stability and predictability. The statement that Tobias’s assessment was adopted only to the extent consistent with the residual functional capacity finding was boilerplate and did not explain the treatment of those limitations.

On these medical-opinion issues, the court granted Samuels’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Testimony and third-party statements

The court found that the administrative law judge improperly discounted Samuels’s testimony about hallucinations, paranoia, anxiety, isolation, concentration problems, and physical limitations. Because the judge did not find that Samuels was malingering, the judge was required to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting the testimony. The court concluded that the judge’s boilerplate language improperly assessed the testimony by comparing it to a residual functional capacity that had already been determined.

The court also found that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain why activities such as walking and using public transportation were transferable to a work setting. The court noted that the record indicated Samuels used walking to cope with hallucinations and other symptoms and that he sometimes avoided public transportation when crowds were present.

The court further held that the reasons used to discount statements from Leatta Poston, a third-party witness, were inadequate. The administrative law judge was required to give reasons specific to that witness, and the reasons used against Samuels’s testimony were not sufficient.

On these issues, the court granted Samuels’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Step-five analysis

The court agreed that the residual functional capacity assessment did not account for all of the limitations described by Drs. Mains and Tobias. Because the residual functional capacity was incomplete, the court also found that the administrative law judge’s step-five analysis could not stand. The court did not hold that vocational-expert testimony was always required. Instead, it explained that the grids may be used only when they accurately represent the claimant’s limitations; sufficiently severe non-exertional limitations may require other evidence about available work.

On this issue, the court granted Samuels’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Disposition

The court concluded that further proceedings were required because unresolved questions remained about the medical opinions, Samuels’s testimony, Poston’s statements, Samuels’s residual functional capacity, and his ability to work. It therefore did not order an immediate award of benefits.

Judge Virginia K. Demarchi ordered that Samuels’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the order. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file.