DeVries v. Social Security

Background

Gina DeVries sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleged that she had been unable to work since March 8, 2014, because of fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue or exhaustion, irritable bowel syndrome, diminished autoimmune capacity, major depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

An administrative law judge found that DeVries had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date and that fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder were severe impairments. The administrative law judge found that DeVries had the residual functional capacity to perform light work with frequent postural activities, simple and routine tasks, and only occasional contact with the public. The administrative law judge concluded that DeVries could perform her past work as a data-entry clerk and alternatively could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The Appeals Council denied review, making that decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Issues and Analysis

DeVries raised five alleged errors: the evaluation of her fibromyalgia symptoms; the weighing of opinions from her treating providers; the rejection of her testimony about symptom severity; the finding that she could perform her past work; and the finding that she could perform other work.

The court rejected DeVries’s argument that the administrative law judge had summarily dismissed her fibromyalgia. The court found that the administrative law judge considered the longitudinal medical record, acknowledged Social Security Ruling 12-2P and both of the diagnostic criteria discussed in that ruling, and treated fibromyalgia as a medically determinable impairment.

The court nevertheless found error in the evaluation of medical opinions. Ryan Gorton, M.D., and Psyche Philips, a nurse practitioner, treated DeVries and opined that her physical and mental symptoms would cause substantial work limitations, including frequent absences, frequent breaks, and an inability to tolerate more than 10 hours of work per week without severe mental-health decompensation. The administrative law judge gave their opinions little weight and gave greater weight to examining and reviewing consultants who generally found that DeVries could perform light work and simple, routine tasks.

Because Dr. Gorton’s opinions conflicted with other medical opinions, the administrative law judge was required to give specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting them. For Philips’s opinion, the administrative law judge was required to give reasons specific to that source. The court found that the administrative law judge did not address all required factors, including the length and frequency of the treatment relationship, or explain clearly how the considered factors supported giving the opinions little weight. The court also held that the stated reasons—that the opinions appeared to rely primarily on DeVries’s reports, conflicted with generally normal mental-status observations, and conflicted with her daily activities—were insufficient. In particular, the administrative law judge did not adequately account for the limits and difficulty DeVries described in performing those activities.

The court also found that the administrative law judge did not provide sufficient clear and convincing reasons for discounting DeVries’s testimony about the severity and functional effects of her symptoms. The administrative law judge could consider objective medical evidence, treatment effectiveness, and daily activities, but fibromyalgia is not confirmed through traditional laboratory testing, and objective evidence could not by itself justify rejecting the reported limitations. The court concluded that the partial improvement DeVries reported from medication did not sufficiently contradict her claimed functional limitations. It also found that her occasional household tasks, caregiving, travel, shopping, and preparation of written reports did not constitute substantial evidence because the record showed that she performed those activities infrequently, with difficulty, with help from others, or with substantial breaks.

The court found that the administrative law judge properly noted that DeVries did not drive because she had never learned to drive. But that fact, the objective findings, her layoff, and her receipt of unemployment benefits did not, together, provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony. Because the medical-opinion and symptom-testimony findings required reassessment of DeVries’s residual functional capacity, the court did not decide her remaining arguments concerning steps four and five of the disability analysis.

Disposition

The court explained that remand for further proceedings is ordinarily required when an administrative law judge denies benefits and the reviewing court finds error. The court found that unresolved issues remained concerning the opinions of Dr. Gorton and Philips, DeVries’s symptom reports, her residual functional capacity, and her ability to work. It therefore remanded the matter for further proceedings rather than ordering an immediate award of benefits.

Judge Virginia Demarchi granted DeVries’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the order, directed the clerk to enter judgment, and closed the file.