De Bruin v. Kijakazi

Background

Carrie Ann De Bruin sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. She alleged disability based on spinal, cardiac, and mental-health conditions. The administrative law judge found that she had severe impairments consisting of degenerative disc disease, arrhythmias, and anxiety disorder, but determined that she could perform light work with physical, environmental, and mental restrictions. The administrative law judge also found that she could not perform her past relevant work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

De Bruin argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated the opinions of examining physician Kara Flavin, M.D., and examining psychologist Ahmed El-Sokkary, Psy.D.; improperly discounted her testimony about the severity of her symptoms; and failed to properly consider a third-party report from her friend, Ralph Ligons, Jr. The Commissioner argued that the administrative law judge’s decision was correct and legally sound.

Medical opinions

The court upheld the administrative law judge’s treatment of Dr. Flavin’s opinion. The administrative law judge gave that opinion partial weight and cited its connection to an earlier disability claim and its postural limitations, which the administrative law judge found excessive in light of other medical findings. The court concluded that the administrative law judge provided a specific and legitimate reason, supported by substantial evidence, for partially discounting the postural limitations. On this issue, De Bruin’s motion for summary judgment was denied and the Commissioner’s cross-motion was granted.

The court ruled differently concerning Dr. El-Sokkary’s opinion. Although the administrative law judge gave the opinion great weight, the administrative law judge did not address Dr. El-Sokkary’s statement that De Bruin would sometimes have difficulty maintaining a regular work schedule without brief interruptions caused by psychiatric symptoms. The court concluded that the administrative law judge erred by failing to explain whether and how that apparent limitation was reflected in the residual functional capacity assessment. On this issue, De Bruin’s motion was granted and the Commissioner’s cross-motion was denied.

Symptom testimony and third-party report

The court found that the administrative law judge gave sufficient reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting De Bruin’s testimony about her mental-health symptoms. Those reasons included limited mental-health treatment, no hospitalization for acute mental symptoms, and records indicating that her anxiety was controlled with medication.

The court found insufficient reasons for discounting De Bruin’s testimony about her physical symptoms. The administrative law judge relied on objective medical findings, but the court explained that those findings could not be the sole basis for discounting pain testimony. The court also found that the administrative law judge did not make specific findings showing that De Bruin’s daily activities were incompatible with her reported symptoms or transferable to a work setting. On this issue, De Bruin’s motion was granted and the Commissioner’s cross-motion was denied.

The court also concluded that the administrative law judge did not explain whether or why he rejected Ralph Ligons’s third-party report. Because the administrative law judge had not adequately discounted De Bruin’s physical-symptom testimony, the court declined to treat the omission as harmless. On this issue, De Bruin’s motion was granted and the Commissioner’s cross-motion was denied.

Disposition

The court concluded that unresolved issues remained concerning De Bruin’s residual functional capacity and ability to work. It therefore applied the ordinary remedy of remanding the matter to the agency for further proceedings rather than ordering an immediate award of benefits.

Judge Demarchi ordered that De Bruin’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the order. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file.