Green v. Mercy Housing, Inc.

Background

Rodney Green, Sr. rented a unit at East Leland Court Apartments beginning in December 2016. The defendants were Mercy Housing, Inc.; Mercy Housing Management Group, Inc., doing business as East Leland Court; Mercy Housing California XXXVIII; and Does 1–10. Green used a cane and needed an in-home caregiver. He alleged that defendants failed to provide promised accessible parking, did not clear overhanging trees from walkways, and prohibited his son Elijah Green—who helped care for him—from coming onto the property.

Defendants served Green with a 60-day notice to terminate his tenancy in December 2017. The parties later agreed to continue the tenancy, with Green agreeing not to allow Elijah onto the property. Green filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing in December 2017. Beginning in June 2018, he failed to pay rent on time, and the Contra Costa Superior Court later entered judgment for Mercy Housing and ordered the Greens to return possession of the premises.

Green’s complaint asserted claims under California’s Disabled Persons Act, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code §§ 12955 and 12955.7, and California Business and Professions Code § 17200. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is a ruling entered without a trial when the court finds that no genuine dispute over a material fact requires a factfinder to decide the case.

Disability and reasonable-accommodation claims

The court addressed Green’s allegations that defendants failed to provide three accommodations: a parking space near his unit and outside the gate, a walkway free of overhanging trees, and permission for Elijah to provide in-home care.

For parking, the court found that Green had access to assigned parking spaces and two handicapped spaces behind the gate. He was also given access to space 136, although defendants said he had been assigned that space from the beginning. The closer spaces outside the gate belonged to the First Baptist Head Start daycare program, not defendants. Because defendants could not provide spaces they did not control, the court held that defendants did not refuse a reasonable accommodation.

For the overhanging trees, the court found no evidence that Green requested defendants to clear the walkways. It therefore held that defendants’ failure to clear them was not a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.

For Elijah’s access to the property, the court found that Green did request an accommodation. But the parties then reached an agreement that rescinded the termination notice while providing that Elijah would not be allowed on the property. The agreement did not ban all in-home caregivers, only Elijah. The court held that this agreement was not a refusal of Green’s accommodation request. The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the reasonable-accommodation claims under the Fair Housing Act, California’s Disabled Persons Act, the Unruh Act, and the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

Race and color discrimination

Green alleged that property manager Evelyn Singh made racist statements and that defendants enforced rent and parking rules differently against African-American residents. The court said the alleged statements were racist and could help establish an initial showing of discrimination if Green also showed that defendants’ actions adversely affected him. But the court found that his evidence about other tenants’ late rent payments and parking treatment included hearsay and was insufficient to establish that initial showing.

The court separately considered the 60-day notice and eviction. Defendants explained that the notice cited alleged lease and rule violations involving Elijah, including unauthorized parking, alleged drug activity, smoking, continued residence in the unit, and a police-related incident. Defendants also presented evidence that Green failed to pay rent for June and July 2018 and later failed to pay rent for September after receiving another opportunity to do so. The court found that Green had not provided admissible evidence that these explanations were a pretext for discrimination. It granted summary judgment on the race- and color-discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act and the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and also granted summary judgment on the related Unruh Act claims.

Retaliation and interference claims

Green alleged that defendants retaliated after he filed his Department of Fair Employment and Housing complaint by ignoring his needs, confronting him about the complaint, and evicting him. The court found that the timing showed the complaint did not cause the 60-day notice or the agreement restricting Elijah’s access: those events occurred before Green filed the complaint or before his agency intake interview.

The court also found no causal connection between the complaint and the eviction. Defendants began eviction proceedings after Green failed to pay rent, and the state court later awarded defendants possession after further nonpayment. The record contained no evidence connecting the eviction proceedings to Green’s agency complaint. The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Green’s fifth, sixth, and seventh claims, which included the retaliation and interference allegations under the Fair Housing Act and California law.

Unfair competition claim

The court granted summary judgment on Green’s California Unfair Competition Law claim under Business and Professions Code § 17200 because that claim relied on the other claims, and the court had granted summary judgment for defendants on all of those claims.

Other requests and final disposition

Green requested a continuance to depose Evelyn Singh, retain a handwriting expert, and obtain original lease-application documents. The court denied that request, finding the record sufficient and noting that discovery had been open for nearly a year and Singh had long been known to the parties.

The court denied as moot the parties’ evidentiary objections to the extent the order did not address them because the court did not consider the challenged statements or documents. It also denied as moot Green’s discovery motion. In conclusion, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all of Green’s claims and stated that judgment would be entered separately for defendants and against Green.