Rice v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Allison Barton Rice bought a below-market-rate condominium through a San Francisco program in 2004. The purchase agreement required written consent before he leased any part of the condominium. Rice lived alone until 2009 and said that having a roommate would help his mental health. He later had rent-paying roommates for much of the period from September 2009 through October 31, 2017.

In 2017, Rice sought written approval for a rent-paying roommate and requested an accommodation for his disabilities. The agency told him that he could have a roommate who did not pay rent, or a rent-paying roommate if he qualified for a temporary financial-hardship exception. Rice ended his current roommate’s lease, sold the condominium in May 2018, and moved to Austin, Texas. The Department of Housing and Urban Development closed his administrative complaint but stated that the closure was not a decision on the merits and that he could file a civil action.

The case concerned two Fair Housing Act claims against the City and County of San Francisco: failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), and interference with housing rights under § 3617. The court had previously dismissed the claims, but the Ninth Circuit reinstated the Fair Housing Act claim concerning the requested rent-paying roommate and sent that issue back for further proceedings.

Summary Judgment on the Fair Housing Act Claims

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court does not decide witness credibility or weigh conflicting evidence at this stage.

The City and County argued that it had already granted Rice’s accommodation by allowing him to have a non-paying roommate. The court held that a genuine factual dispute existed about whether agency employees knew that Rice was requesting a rent-paying roommate. The record included Rice’s requests for written consent and testimony from agency employees indicating that they knew he was seeking a paying roommate.

The City and County also argued that a rent-paying roommate was not necessary as a matter of law. The court found disputes about whether Rice needed a paying roommate to receive the mental-health benefits of the living arrangement. Rice’s primary-care physician and expert offered opinions supporting the need for a rent-paying roommate. The court also found a dispute about whether alternative arrangements, such as a roommate paying for groceries and utilities instead of rent, would provide equivalent benefits.

The City and County further argued that allowing rent-paying roommates would be unreasonable because it would fundamentally change the below-market-rate program or create excessive administrative and financial burdens. The court found factual disputes on both points. The program already had a process for managing temporary rentals, and the record indicated that rental income did not affect resale prices. A reasonable jury could therefore find that allowing some disabled residents to have rent-paying roommates would not fundamentally alter the program. The court denied summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate claim.

For the interference claim, the court found a genuine factual dispute based in part on an agency letter warning Rice that the City and County might take enforcement action if he did not cure the alleged violation. The court denied summary judgment on the interference claim as well.

Individual Defendants

Rice did not oppose the individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment in favor of those defendants, also noting that they were redundant defendants in the action.

Equitable Defenses

Rice moved for judgment on the pleadings concerning four equitable defenses asserted by the City and County: good faith, unclean hands, proper conduct, and acting in good faith. Judgment on the pleadings tests whether, accepting the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court granted Rice judgment on the pleadings on all four defenses. It held that the defenses were not valid defenses to liability under the Fair Housing Act because the statute authorizes broad equitable relief to serve important national policies. The court added that the parties’ conduct could still be considered when evaluating available equitable remedies.

Disposition

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants, denied the City and County’s summary judgment, and granted Rice judgment on the pleadings on the four equitable defenses. The order disposed of the two motions identified as ECF Nos. 132 and 135.