Duke v. San Francisco Community College District

Background

Shalamon Duke sued the San Francisco Community College District (CCSF or the District), Chancellor Mark William Rocha, and unnamed defendants. He alleged that CCSF terminated him after a complaint concerning alleged sexual harassment at a former employer became known. Duke asserted 14 causes of action, including constitutional due-process and equal-protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an Equal Pay Act claim, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, race discrimination under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Family and Medical Leave Act violations, retaliation, breach of contract, emotional-distress claims, a California open-meeting notice claim, and an Unruh Act claim.

Defendants moved to dismiss all 14 causes of action and to strike portions of the amended complaint. They also argued that Duke was required to challenge his termination through an administrative mandate rather than through this lawsuit.

Administrative-Mandate Argument

The court rejected defendants’ argument. It explained that the argument was not really about federal subject-matter jurisdiction, but about whether a prior administrative process could have preclusive effect. Because the District’s statements indicated that the pre-termination meeting was a courtesy rather than a legally required hearing, and because the record did not show that the law required evidence to be taken, Duke was not required to seek administrative mandate relief. The argument therefore failed.

Rulings on the Claims

The court dismissed the equal-protection theory of Duke’s first § 1983 claim as to both defendants, with leave to amend. It dismissed the due-process theory of that claim as to both defendants with prejudice. The court concluded that Duke had a protected employment interest under California law, but that the allegations showed he received written notice of the complaints and an opportunity to respond before termination.

The court dismissed the second claim under the Equal Pay Act with leave to amend. It held that comparing Duke’s pay with one opposite-sex employee can be appropriate when only one comparable employee exists, but Duke had not alleged that the District employed only one comparable female employee. The court allowed amendment for the limited purpose of adding that allegation, if it could be made consistently with Rule 11.

The court dismissed Duke’s third claim under § 1981 as to both defendants with prejudice. It concluded that his public employment was created by statute rather than by contract, so he did not identify a contractual interest supporting that claim.

The court dismissed the fourth claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act with leave to amend because Duke’s allegations that his replacement was at least 10 years younger were too conclusory.

The court dismissed Duke’s fifth and seventh claims, alleging race discrimination under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, as alleged against CCSF with leave to amend. The court found no plausible allegations connecting the termination to Duke’s sex, gender, color, or race. As alleged against Rocha, those claims were dismissed with prejudice because the court concluded that individual supervisors are not personally liable for discrimination under the cited California law.

The court dismissed the sixth claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act as to both defendants with prejudice. Duke alleged that he began working for the District in July 2018 and was terminated in January 2019, so his allegations showed that he had not worked for the District for the required 12 months.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the eighth claim, a California Fair Employment and Housing Act retaliation claim based on Duke’s complaint about his pay, as alleged against CCSF. The court concluded that the timing between the complaint and termination adequately alleged a possible causal connection at the pleading stage. The claim against Rocha was dismissed with prejudice because the court held that individual nonemployers cannot be held liable for this retaliation claim.

The court dismissed the ninth Fair Employment and Housing Act retaliation claim, based on an asserted right to due process, as alleged against CCSF with leave to amend. Duke had not alleged that he asserted a due-process right before his termination. The claim against Rocha was dismissed with prejudice.

The court dismissed the tenth breach-of-contract claim with prejudice. It concluded that California public employment is held by statute rather than contract and that the document Duke identified did not establish a contractual right to continued employment.

The court denied the motion to dismiss Duke’s eleventh and fourteenth claims, for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as alleged against CCSF. It rejected defendants’ arguments at the pleading stage concerning workers’ compensation exclusivity, governmental immunity, and the characterization of the negligent-infliction claim. As alleged against Rocha, the motion was granted and those claims were dismissed with prejudice because the court held that individual employees generally cannot be sued for personnel actions.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the twelfth claim under California Government Code § 54957. Duke alleged that he did not receive the required notice because the notice was emailed rather than delivered personally or by physical mail. The court stated that the statute appeared to provide a remedy without requiring proof of harm, but noted that the claim had not been fully briefed and identified several issues for future briefing.

The court dismissed Duke’s thirteenth Unruh Act claim with prejudice as to both defendants because Duke agreed to dismiss it.

Motion to Strike and Judicial Notice

The court struck Duke’s requests for punitive damages based on claims against the District because Duke clarified that he sought punitive damages only against Rocha individually. The court stated that defendants’ request concerning Rocha was moot because no claims remained against him after the order. The court declined to strike allegations that the District was strictly liable for its agents’ acts. Accordingly, the motion to strike was granted in part and denied in part.

The court granted defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of a complaint filed in a California state court, taking notice only of the document’s existence and not of the truth of its factual contents.

Disposition

The order granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. Duke was allowed 21 days to file an amended complaint, and he could not add new parties or causes of action without court permission or the agreement of all defendants. The supplied opinion text mentions Duke’s motion to remand but does not state a separate ruling on that motion.