Duke v. San Francisco Community College District

Background

Shalamon Duke sued the San Francisco Community College District (CCSF), Chancellor Mark William Rocha, and Does 1–10. Duke alleged that he was an African American educator who became CCSF’s Associate Vice Chancellor of Student Development in June 2018. He alleged that his starting salary was lower than the salary of a Latina counterpart hired at the same time for the same associate vice chancellor position.

Duke also alleged that, after a lawsuit was filed against him concerning alleged sexual harassment at a former employer, CCSF placed him on administrative leave and terminated his employment. According to Duke, CCSF said its action was based on his failure to disclose that a complaint was pending during his hiring process, rather than on the truth of the allegations. Duke alleged that the CCSF Board of Trustees voted to terminate him in January 2019, after a pre-disciplinary hearing.

The operative complaint asserted fourteen causes of action. The defendants’ motion addressed the second and fifth through tenth causes of action: the claim under California Government Code section 54957; the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Equal Pay Act claim; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim; Title VII and California Fair Employment and Housing Act discrimination claims; and a California Fair Employment and Housing Act retaliation claim.

Judicial Notice

The defendants asked the court to take judicial notice of a state-court complaint and documents from CCSF’s website, including a board agenda, board minutes, and an organizational chart. Duke did not oppose the request. The court granted the request as to the public records and the availability of information on CCSF’s website, but it did not take notice of the truth of information asserted on the website.

Government Code Section 54957 Notice Claim

Duke alleged that CCSF failed to give him timely personal or mailed notice of the December 13, 2018, and January 24, 2019, Board meetings. The court explained that California Government Code section 54957 requires written notice at least 24 hours before a closed session when the board will hear specific complaints or charges against an employee. Under the California decisions discussed by the court, that notice requirement does not apply merely because a board is considering an employee’s discipline or dismissal.

The court held that Duke plausibly alleged a section 54957 violation concerning the December 2018 meeting. The complaint suggested that the board may have considered facts or evidence about Duke’s situation at that meeting, making it plausible that the board heard a complaint or charge requiring notice.

The court reached a different conclusion about the January 2019 meeting. It characterized that meeting as a dismissal decision, not an evidentiary hearing or an accusation requiring the statutory notice. The court therefore granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss the second claim and dismissed with prejudice the portion concerning the January 2019 meeting. The portion concerning the December 2018 meeting was not dismissed.

Section 1983 Equal-Protection Claim

Duke brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Rocha violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by treating him differently from non-African American male employees. The court held that CCSF, as a California community college district considered an arm of the state, is not a “person” subject to a damages claim under section 1983. The same limitation applied to Rocha in his official capacity because Duke sought only monetary damages.

A section 1983 damages claim against Rocha in his personal capacity could proceed only if Duke alleged that Rocha personally caused the constitutional violation. The court considered that version of the claim but found that Duke did not allege that Rocha personally acted with discriminatory intent based on Duke’s race or personally classified him as African American.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the fifth claim. It dismissed with prejudice the claim against CCSF and Rocha in his official capacity, and also dismissed with prejudice the personal-capacity claim against Rocha.

Equal Pay Act Claim

Duke alleged that CCSF paid his Latina counterpart more than it paid him even though she held a position with substantially equal work and responsibilities. The court explained that the Equal Pay Act permits comparison of jobs that are substantially equal, based on actual job-performance requirements rather than titles alone.

The court found that Duke plausibly alleged that his counterpart was hired for the same position, was the only other associate vice chancellor of student affairs, and was paid more. An email from Vice Chancellor Trudy Walton supported the alleged pay difference. The court stated that other associate vice chancellors might later prove to have similar responsibilities, but that issue could not defeat the claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the sixth claim.

Age Discrimination Claim

Duke alleged that a substantially younger person assumed his duties after his termination. The court found that Duke had not provided factual allegations about the replacement’s age and had not added facts showing that CCSF considered Duke’s age significant. Because Duke had previously been given an opportunity to correct the deficiency and had not done so, the court concluded that further amendment would be futile.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the seventh claim and dismissed the claim with prejudice.

Race-Discrimination Claims

Duke asserted race-discrimination claims under Title VII and California law. He alleged that CCSF’s stated reason for terminating him—his failure to disclose the pending complaint—was not the real reason, and that the termination was instead based on the allegations’ contents and his race. He also alleged that other senior administrators had faced accusations but were not removed.

The court found those allegations insufficient. It noted that Duke did not provide details about the other officials or their racial groups, so the court could not compare their treatment with Duke’s. The court also found no connection between the alleged misconduct complaint and Duke’s race. It therefore concluded that Duke had not pleaded circumstances supporting an inference of race discrimination.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the eighth and ninth claims and dismissed both claims with prejudice.

Retaliation Claim

Duke’s tenth claim alleged retaliation under California Government Code section 12940(h). The court had previously found that he did not adequately plead protected activity or a causal connection between protected activity and the employment action. The court stated that the amended allegations did not cure those deficiencies and that its prior reasoning continued to apply.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the tenth claim and dismissed it with prejudice.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss the section 54957 claim, dismissing with prejudice the portion concerning the January 2019 Board meeting. It granted the motion as to the section 1983, ADEA, Title VII and FEHA discrimination, and FEHA retaliation claims, dismissing those claims with prejudice. It denied the motion as to the Equal Pay Act claim. Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton entered the order on April 10, 2020.