Ramirez v. City Of Gilroy
- Virginia Demarchi
- 5:17-cv-00625
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 14
In Ramirez v. City Of Gilroy, Judge Demarchi ruled on trial-evidence motions and ordered separate liability and damages phases.
The order affects Alma Ramirez and the other plaintiffs, the City of Gilroy and the other defendants, the witnesses and experts who may testify, and the jury that will hear the case.
What happened
Ramirez v. City Of Gilroy concerns a trial involving the death of Mr. Alvarez and claims against the City of Gilroy and other defendants. Before trial, the parties asked the court to decide which evidence could be presented to the jury and whether liability and damages should be considered separately.
The court granted, denied, or deferred the motions in limine in different parts. It excluded most evidence of tattoos, gang activity, drug use, criminal history, agency conclusions, disputed paternity, unrelated police incidents, and certain expert opinions, while allowing limited evidence for specified purposes. It also denied some requests to exclude evidence, including evidence that Mr. Alvarez was unarmed, and denied two video-related motions without prejudice. The court ordered liability and damages to be tried separately.
Judge Virginia K. Demarchi issued the order on March 27, 2020. The order addresses pretrial issues and does not decide the parties’ underlying liability claims.
The detailed version
- Ramirez v. City Of Gilroy · No. 5:17-cv-00625
- Virginia Demarchi
- Mar. 27, 2020
Background
The court held a pretrial conference on February 26, 2020, and issued this order resolving the parties’ motions in limine and the plaintiffs’ conditional motion to bifurcate liability and damages. A motion in limine is a request for a pretrial ruling about whether particular evidence may be presented at trial. The order states that separate orders would address proposed jury instructions and other matters.
Plaintiffs’ Motions in Limine
- Tattoos and alleged gang affiliation: The motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court allowed the dispatch communications received by Officer Moon and permitted him to testify about relevant officer training, to the extent properly disclosed under Rule 26. The court excluded evidence of Mr. Alvarez’s tattoos, except when they appeared in images or videos admitted for another purpose, and excluded other evidence of alleged gang affiliation or gang activity as unduly prejudicial. - Drug use: The motion was granted. The court excluded evidence of Mr. Alvarez’s past or present drug use, including the toxicology evidence showing hydrocodone in his system. The court found the defendants’ proposed connection between the drug and Mr. Alvarez’s conduct speculative and insufficient to overcome the risk of prejudice. - Criminal history: The motion was granted in part regarding liability, and the court deferred ruling on damages. For liability, the court excluded Mr. Alvarez’s adult criminal history, including a misdemeanor conviction, prior arrests, and pending charges or investigations. The court found that evidence too limited and speculative to support the proposed motive to evade capture, and found that its prejudicial effect outweighed its limited relevance. The court allowed evidence of the existence and terms of the criminal domestic-violence protective order for the limited purpose of showing that Mr. Alvarez may have had a motive or intent to evade capture. The court deferred deciding whether additional criminal-history evidence could be used on damages because some such evidence might bear on the value of the plaintiffs’ lost relationships. - Agency findings: The motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court excluded findings and conclusions by the Santa Clara County District Attorney, the City of Gilroy, the Gilroy Police Department, or another agency about whether Officer Moon’s conduct was justified, reasonable, criminal, or consistent with City policies. The parties could still present otherwise admissible evidence about policies, practices, training, or other conduct standards. The court allowed neutral references to an investigation and allowed evidence about the timing and context of Officer Moon’s statements, including possible changes or inconsistencies. - Paternity of the minor children: The motion was granted. The court excluded references describing the minor plaintiffs as “purported” children or otherwise questioning their paternity, unless the defendants later made a showing that particular impeachment evidence was relevant.
Defendants’ Motions in Limine
- Other Gilroy Police Department incidents: The motion was granted, except that specific evidence could be used to impeach specific testimony if a witness gave testimony that it contradicted. - Other reports of police use of force: The motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court generally excluded evidence and references to unrelated specific incidents of police use of excessive or deadly force. It allowed limited questioning of prospective jurors about whether exposure to information about other officer-involved shootings affected their impartiality, limited testimony about matters relevant to the police-procedure experts’ qualifications and experience, and allowed limited general references during closing argument consistent with Ninth Circuit guidance. - Threat or use of force against Ms. Flores: The court deferred ruling. It stated that, if neither party offered Ms. Flores’s testimony or statements, the evidence would be excluded; if such testimony or statements were offered, their context might be relevant. - Post-incident body-camera footage: The motion was denied without prejudice. The parties agreed to review the proposed video, audio, and images and confer further. The defendants could renew the motion if disputes remained. - Videos and photographs of Mr. Alvarez: The motion was denied without prejudice. The parties were directed to confer further about the disputed autopsy photographs and video clips, and the defendants could renew the motion if disputes remained. - Evidence that Mr. Alvarez was unarmed: The motion was denied. The court found that Mr. Alvarez’s lack of a weapon was relevant to assessing Officer Moon’s credibility and to the plaintiffs’ position that Officer Moon’s belief that Mr. Alvarez was armed was unreasonable. The court stated that a jury instruction could address the defendants’ concerns. - Plaintiffs’ expert Roger Clark: The motion was granted in part and denied in part. Mr. Clark could not testify to opinions absent from his written expert report, unless the defendants had solicited those opinions during his deposition. He could not testify about which side’s version of disputed events was more credible, or about the dismissed failure-to-train claims, although he could testify about relevant training as it related to applicable standards and practices. The court denied the request to exclude his criticism of Officer Moon’s conduct before Mr. Alvarez descended the stairs, finding that the alleged concessions were subjects for cross-examination. The court also limited expert testimony about legal standards, legal conclusions, and matters outside the expert’s specialized knowledge. Mr. Clark could testify about police practices and whether conduct was consistent with applicable guidelines, but could not testify about what the law required or whether conduct was unlawful, unconstitutional, negligent, or excessive force in the legal sense. - Critique of Mr. Alvarez’s detention: The motion was granted. The court excluded evidence or references concerning whether Officer Moon had legal justification to detain Mr. Alvarez, and said it would separately decide whether to give the requested jury instruction. - Incorrect standard for use of force: The motion was granted in part and denied in part. Mr. Clark could not testify that the law always required an officer to see a weapon before using deadly force, or otherwise present that statement as a legal conclusion. If properly disclosed and supported, however, he could testify that Officer Moon’s use of deadly force was inappropriate under the specific circumstances of this case. The court would separately decide whether to give the requested jury instruction.
Bifurcation of Liability and Damages
The plaintiffs asked the court to bifurcate, or separate, the liability and damages phases because evidence potentially relevant only to damages could unfairly affect the jury’s decision about liability. The defendants opposed bifurcation as unnecessary and inefficient. The court was persuaded that separating the issues would prevent potentially prejudicial damages evidence from influencing the liability determination. The court therefore ordered that liability and damages be bifurcated.
Disposition and Classification
This was a pretrial order resolving evidentiary motions and ordering separate liability and damages proceedings. It did not decide who was liable on the underlying claims. The classification is procedural_order.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.