Gomez v. Fachko

Background

Omar Gomez brought an excessive-force action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Santa Clara and Santa Clara police officer Jordan Fachko. He also brought California-law claims. The case arose from a police shooting on October 21, 2017, after officers attempted to stop a Honda Civic reported stolen.

The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Gomez because the defendants sought summary judgment. According to that evidence, Fachko and another officer boxed in Gomez’s car at a red light. Gomez reversed about 16 inches at no more than 1.2 miles per hour and struck the other officer’s patrol vehicle. The car then stopped, Gomez put his hands up, and he removed his foot from the gas pedal. About one second later, Fachko fired three shots from the driver’s side. Two shots struck Gomez in the chest, and one struck the car’s driver-side pillar.

Fachko said he believed Gomez was trying to run him over or drive through the area to escape. The court noted evidence that the car was stopped when Fachko fired, that Gomez’s hands were up, that Fachko did not see Gomez turn the steering wheel toward him, and that the car’s front wheels were turned slightly away from Fachko.

Before filing this civil case, Gomez pleaded no contest to resisting an officer and vehicle theft. At the plea hearing, the parties identified the factual basis for the resisting-officer conviction as Gomez backing his car into the other officer’s patrol vehicle. Gomez’s counsel also stated, and the state court confirmed, that Gomez was not agreeing that Fachko was acting lawfully when the shooting occurred.

Gomez initially asserted eight claims: excessive force; denial of medical care; three forms of municipal liability against the City of Santa Clara; battery; negligence; and violation of California’s Bane Civil Rights Act. Gomez did not oppose summary judgment on the medical-care and municipal-liability claims and instead dismissed them. The court dismissed those four claims with prejudice.

Defendants’ Arguments and the Court’s Rulings

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims and argued that Gomez’s no-contest plea barred the lawsuit under Heck v. Humphrey and its California equivalent. Those rules can prevent a civil-rights claim when winning the claim would necessarily show that an existing criminal conviction was invalid.

The court rejected that argument. It held that Gomez’s conviction was based on resisting the other officer by backing into that officer’s patrol vehicle, while the alleged excessive force occurred afterward and involved Fachko. Therefore, a finding that Fachko used excessive force would not necessarily invalidate Gomez’s conviction. The court held that the same reasoning allowed Gomez’s California-law claims to proceed.

The defendants also argued that qualified immunity protected Fachko. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court held that, under Gomez’s version of the facts, Fachko violated Gomez’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force. The court relied on Ninth Circuit decisions involving shootings at slow-moving or stopped vehicles when no person was in the vehicle’s path, the vehicle was not accelerating toward an officer, and there was no adequate reason to believe the driver posed a serious threat.

The court concluded that the evidence could support a finding that Gomez’s car was stopped and boxed in, Gomez’s hands were raised, the car was not accelerating, and no one was in its path. It therefore held that Fachko was not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage.

The defendants argued that the California battery and negligence claims failed because Fachko’s use of deadly force was reasonable. The court rejected that argument because a genuine dispute of material fact existed about whether the force was reasonable. As to the Bane Act claim, the court held that evidence of reckless disregard for constitutional rights could establish the required specific intent, and it found summary judgment inappropriate on that claim as well.

Disposition

The court DENIED the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It DISMISSED with prejudice Gomez’s claims for denial of medical care against Fachko and municipal liability against the City for an unconstitutional policy or custom, ratification, and failure to train.

The claims remaining for trial were: excessive force under the Fourth Amendment against Fachko; battery under California law against Fachko and the City; negligence under California law against Fachko and the City; and violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act against Fachko and the City.