D.T. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- Virginia Demarchi
- 5:20-cv-00793
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 12
In D.T. v. Commissioner, Judge Demarchi granted D.T.’s summary-judgment motion, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and remanded for further proceedings.
D.T. and the Social Security Administration’s decision-making process. The administrative law judge must reconsider the treating providers’ opinions, but the order does not award benefits.
What happened
In D.T. v. Commissioner of Social Security, D.T. challenged the denial of her application for supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that she had several severe impairments but could perform certain jobs, and therefore denied benefits.
D.T. argued that the administrative law judge improperly discounted opinions from her treating psychiatrist, psychologist, and nurse practitioner. The court found that the judge did not consider all required factors when evaluating those opinions. It also found that the judge lacked substantial evidence for relying on a claim that D.T. panhandled daily at multiple locations.
The court granted D.T.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and sent the matter back for further proceedings. Judge Demarchi ordered the administrative law judge to reassess the medical opinions and provide legally adequate reasons for discounting any part of them.
The detailed version
- D.T. v. Commissioner of Social Security · No. 5:20-cv-00793
- Virginia Demarchi
- May 11, 2021
Background
D.T. appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The administrative law judge found severe impairments including right-hip trochanteric bursitis, obesity, post-traumatic stress disorder, and major depressive disorder. The judge determined that D.T. had a residual functional capacity—her remaining ability to work despite her impairments—for less than the full range of light work, with limits involving physical tasks, concentration, social interaction, and workplace adaptation. The judge concluded that D.T. could perform jobs existing in the national economy, including housekeeping cleaner, photocopy machine operator, and packing line worker.
Issues and analysis
D.T. challenged the administrative law judge’s treatment of two sets of opinions from treating providers. One opinion, signed by treating psychiatrist Harun Evcimen, M.D., and treating nurse practitioner Nicole Una, described limitations involving standing, sitting, social interaction, concentration, and likely absences from work. The other, from Dr. Evcimen and treating psychologist Bret Fimiani, Psy.D., described marked limitations in daily activities, social functioning, concentration, persistence, pace, and adapting to work settings.
The court applied the treating-physician rule applicable to applications filed before March 27, 2017. Under that rule, a treating doctor’s opinion receives controlling weight when it is well supported and consistent with the record. If it is not given controlling weight, the administrative law judge must consider specified factors, including the treatment relationship, examination frequency, supportability, consistency, and the provider’s specialization. The judge must also give legally sufficient reasons for discounting the opinion.
As to the opinion from Ms. Una and Dr. Evcimen, the court found that the administrative law judge did not consider all required factors. The court agreed that the judge had provided a clear and convincing reason for finding that the opinion was inconsistent with treatment notes describing mild or moderate mental-health symptoms and improvement. But the failure to consider the required regulatory factors was reversible error.
As to the opinion from Dr. Evcimen and Dr. Fimiani, the court again found that the administrative law judge did not adequately consider the required factors, including the length and extent of the treatment relationship, examination frequency, and specialization. The court also found that the judge’s reliance on D.T.’s panhandling was not supported by substantial evidence. The record showed only limited panhandling activity and did not establish that D.T. panhandled daily or regularly, or explain how that activity conflicted with her claimed impairments or ability to work.
Disposition
The court granted D.T.’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. It remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, the administrative law judge must reassess the opinions from Ms. Una, Dr. Evcimen, and Dr. Fimiani in light of the entire record and provide legally adequate reasons for discounting or rejecting any portion of them. The court did not direct an award of benefits.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.