V.R. v. Kijakazi

Background

V.R. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. He alleged disability beginning July 17, 2013, based on a heart attack, diabetes, shoulder injuries, sleep apnea, and knee pain.

The administrative law judge found that V.R. had several severe impairments, including heart disease, diabetes with neuropathy and eye complications, chronic pain syndrome, shoulder and hip conditions, and related conditions. The judge determined that V.R. could perform a limited range of light work, could not return to his past work as a cement mason, but could perform jobs such as cashier II, inspector/hand packager, and storage facility rental clerk. The Commissioner’s Appeals Council declined review.

V.R. argued that the administrative law judge improperly discounted his testimony that neuropathic foot pain limited him to comfortably standing or walking for no more than 15 to 20 minutes at a time. He also argued that the judge should have included limitations related to chronic pain in his residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his impairments—and that the judge improperly found at the final step of the disability analysis that he could perform the identified jobs.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge failed to give adequate reasons for discounting V.R.’s testimony about his neuropathic foot pain. The judge had concluded that V.R.’s pain was manageable with recommended medication, injections, and exercises, and relied on two treatment records showing that V.R. initially declined or delayed some medication. But the court found that the broader medical record showed V.R. later agreed to increase Nortriptyline, began taking Gabapentin, resumed Gabapentin after a side effect, and continued to report foot pain. The two records cited by the judge therefore did not provide substantial evidence for the conclusion that V.R. routinely declined medication or that his pain was manageable.

The court rejected V.R.’s argument that the residual functional capacity had to include mental limitations involving concentration, persistence, and pace. V.R. had not identified record evidence or an allegation supporting those limitations based solely on his diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome.

The court nevertheless agreed that the residual functional capacity did not adequately account for the standing and walking limits described in V.R.’s testimony because the administrative law judge had not given sufficient reasons for rejecting that testimony. The court also found that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert did not include all the limitations that should have been considered. Because of that error, the court found it unnecessary to decide V.R.’s separate argument about whether the identified jobs were otherwise consistent with the reaching restriction in the residual functional capacity.

Disposition

The court held that the requirements for an immediate award of benefits under the credit-as-true doctrine were not met because additional issues remained to be resolved. It directed that, on remand, the administrative law judge reconsider V.R.’s testimony about his neuropathic foot pain and, if necessary, reassess his residual functional capacity and reconsider the final-step job findings.

The court granted in part and denied in part V.R.’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order. The court directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the file.