Harper v. City of San Jose

Background

Defendants City of San Jose, Edgardo Garcia, Jason Dwyer, Christopher Sciba, and Jared Yuen filed a partial motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). That rule tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally valid claim. The court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true and views them in the plaintiff’s favor, but does not accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences as facts.

The complaint alleged constitutional and state-law claims arising from police conduct at a protest. Among other allegations, Harper claimed that Yuen fired a rubber bullet at him while he was backing away. Harper also asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services. A Monell claim seeks to hold a local government responsible for a constitutional violation caused by an official policy, custom, or inadequate training.

Rulings on the Claims

The court dismissed the claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities without leave to amend. Because the City itself was also sued, the court found those official-capacity claims duplicative. The court likewise dismissed claims 1 and 2 against the City without leave to amend because those claims were duplicative of the Monell claim based on the same conduct.

The court dismissed Harper’s federal claims against Chief Garcia in his personal capacity with leave to amend. Harper had not alleged that Garcia was personally involved in the protest response. The court also found that Garcia’s post-incident statement describing Yuen as a “good kid” who had made a mistake did not amount to ratification of Yuen’s conduct. The court stated that an amended complaint would need non-conclusory facts showing Garcia’s personal involvement or his awareness of inadequate less-lethal-weapons training and failure to correct it, as well as a causal connection to the alleged constitutional violations.

The court dismissed Harper’s federal claims against Sergeant Sciba in his personal capacity with leave to amend. Harper based those claims on Sciba’s alleged supervisory responsibility for training materials concerning less-lethal weapons. The court found that Harper had not alleged enough facts connecting those materials to Yuen’s actions, including no allegation that Yuen had viewed the materials.

The court denied the motion to dismiss Harper’s federal claims against Captain Dwyer in his personal capacity. Harper alleged that Dwyer was present at the protest, made statements about entering a “warzone” and making an immediate decision, and said he had no regrets about his decisions. Although the allegations were sparse, the court found it reasonable to infer that Dwyer gave commands generally followed by Yuen and other officers, making the claims sufficient to proceed beyond the dismissal stage.

The court dismissed Harper’s Monell claim against the City with leave to amend. Harper had not clearly identified the theory or theories supporting that claim. The court found no adequately alleged formal policy, no sufficient facts establishing a widespread custom or practice, insufficient allegations of ratification, and insufficient non-conclusory facts supporting a failure-to-train theory. The court stated that Harper would need to allege facts showing deliberate indifference to the need for additional or different training.

The court dismissed Harper’s California Bane Act claim under California Civil Code section 52.1 against Garcia, Dwyer, and Sciba with leave to amend. It stated that supervisory liability does not apply to a Bane Act claim and that Harper would need to allege direct action by each of those defendants against him.

The court denied the motion to dismiss Harper’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Yuen. It found the allegations sufficient, at this stage, to allege outrageous conduct, intent or reckless disregard for causing emotional distress, and resulting emotional distress.

Disposition

Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered that the motion was granted in part with leave to amend in part and denied in part. Harper was ordered to file an amended complaint within 30 days. The court stated that failing to meet the deadline or failing to correct the identified deficiencies would result in dismissal of the deficient claims with prejudice. The court declined to decide qualified immunity because defendants raised it only in a brief mention in their opening motion.