L.D. v. Saul
- Virginia Demarchi
- 5:20-cv-06906
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 14
In L.D. v. Kijakazi, Judge Demarchi remanded the disability-benefits case after finding errors in medical-opinion and step-five analyses.
L.D.’s claim for disability insurance benefits was sent back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings; the order did not award benefits.
What happened
In L.D. v. Kijakazi, L.D. challenged the denial of disability insurance benefits, arguing that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated medical opinions, her testimony about symptoms, and the availability of other work.
The court agreed that the judge did not adequately explain why he rejected certain limits on using L.D.’s right hand and did not properly address possible conflicts between job testimony and official job descriptions. The court also found that the judge failed to consider L.D.’s borderline age category, but upheld the evaluation of her symptom testimony.
Judge Demarchi granted in part and denied in part both sides’ summary-judgment motions and sent the case back for further administrative proceedings. The administrative law judge must reconsider the medical opinions, job evidence, and L.D.’s age category.
The detailed version
- L.D. v. Saul · No. 5:20-cv-06906
- Virginia Demarchi
- Mar. 31, 2022
Background
L.D. sought judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. She alleged disability beginning February 20, 2015, based mainly on right-shoulder conditions and pain after both hips had been replaced. An administrative law judge found that she had severe right-shoulder impairments and the condition following her hip replacements, but determined that she could perform sedentary work with additional restrictions. The judge concluded that she could not return to her past work but could perform other jobs, including final assembler, bench hand, and dial marker.
L.D. challenged three parts of the decision: the treatment of limitations assessed by examining physician Lara Salamacha and state-agency consultant S. Lee; the evaluation of L.D.’s testimony about her symptoms and limitations; and the finding that sufficient jobs existed for her at the final step of the disability analysis.
Medical-opinion evidence
The court held that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain why Dr. Salamacha’s and Dr. Lee’s opinions were less persuasive regarding manipulative limitations involving L.D.’s right hand. Dr. Salamacha had examined L.D. and assessed limits on reaching, handling, feeling, fingering, and grasping. The judge discounted those opinions partly because Dr. Salamacha’s examination was a single snapshot and because the opinions conflicted with medical expert Dr. A. Lorber’s opinion. The court found that explanation insufficient because the judge did not clearly identify the evidence that better supported omitting the manipulative limits from L.D.’s residual functional capacity, meaning her maximum ability to work despite her impairments.
Subjective symptom testimony
The court upheld the administrative law judge’s treatment of L.D.’s testimony. Because the judge found that L.D.’s impairments could reasonably cause her symptoms and identified no evidence of malingering, the judge needed specific, clear, and convincing reasons to find that her description of the severity and effects of those symptoms was not entirely consistent with the record. The court found that standard met based on imaging showing mild or negative findings, multiple examinations showing substantially normal findings, improvement with treatment, and other evidence. The court noted that the judge’s reliance on daily activities was not well-supported, but found that the other reasons were enough.
Step-five job finding
The court held that the finding about available work was not supported by substantial evidence. L.D.’s residual functional capacity required her to change position after sitting for no more than one hour, while the Commissioner’s guidance stated that sedentary work generally requires remaining seated for approximately two-hour intervals. The vocational expert testified that L.D. could perform three sedentary jobs, but was not asked to explain how those jobs could be performed consistently with her sitting restriction. The administrative law judge also did not address that potential conflict between the expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, an official source describing job requirements.
The court also held that the administrative law judge failed to consider L.D.’s borderline age situation. L.D. was 49 years, 8 months, and 24 days old when the judge issued the decision, placing her within three months of the age category for a person closely approaching advanced age. The court stated that, given her limited education and the testimony that she had no transferable skills, using the older category would result in a disability determination. The judge did not discuss the borderline age issue or document how he considered it.
Disposition
The court stated that it was not clear from the record that proper evaluation of all the evidence would require an award of benefits. It therefore remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the administrative law judge must reassess the opinions of Dr. Salamacha and Dr. Lee, reconsider the vocational expert’s testimony and any conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, obtain additional testimony if necessary, and consider and document the appropriate age category.
The court granted in part and denied in part L.D.’s motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. It remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the order and directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the file.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.