Polanco v. State of California

Background

The plaintiffs, identified as Patricia Polanco’s successors-in-interest, challenged conditions surrounding a May 30, 2020 transfer of 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men to San Quentin State Prison. The complaint alleged that many transferred inmates had not recently been tested or properly screened for COVID-19, that they were crowded onto buses, and that they were housed with San Quentin’s existing population. The complaint further alleged that the prison’s COVID-19 cases increased substantially after the transfer.

The plaintiffs alleged that Sergeant Gilbert Polanco had several risk factors for serious COVID-19 illness. They also alleged that staffing shortages required him to work additional hours and transport sick inmates, including inmates with COVID-19, to hospitals in unsanitized vehicles and without appropriate personal protective equipment. Polanco contracted COVID-19 around June 21, 2020, developed symptoms, and died from COVID-19 complications on August 9, 2020.

The court had previously allowed the plaintiffs’ allegations that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to Polanco’s constitutional rights to proceed, but dismissed their claim under California Civil Code section 52.1, commonly called the Bane Act. The court found that the original complaint did not allege that a defendant interfered with Polanco’s rights by “threat, intimidation, or coercion.” The plaintiffs amended their complaint, and defendants again moved to dismiss the Bane Act claim.

Legal standard

The court applied Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally recognized claim or does not allege enough facts to make the claim plausible. When deciding such a motion, the court generally treats the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party. A court ordinarily gives a plaintiff an opportunity to amend, but may deny amendment when, among other reasons, further amendment would be futile.

Discussion

The Bane Act provides a claim for violations of state or federal civil rights committed by threats, intimidation, or coercion. The court explained that this element does not always have to be separate from the underlying rights violation. In wrongful-arrest and excessive-force cases, for example, the relevant coercion may already be present, and specific intent to violate rights can sometimes satisfy the requirement. The court also noted that deliberate indifference toward an inmate may satisfy the coercion requirement in the custody context.

The court held that the amended allegations did not show that defendants interfered with Polanco’s rights through threat, intimidation, or coercion. The allegations that defendants required or compelled Polanco to work under unsafe conditions “upon pain of losing his career” described the ordinary pressure associated with employment, not the type of coercion required by the Bane Act. The court also rejected the argument that a constitutional-rights violation combined with specific intent automatically satisfies the Bane Act’s coercion element. It stated that the cases applying that reasoning involved unlawful arrests, where some coercion is inherent in the detention.

The court distinguished employment cases involving direct threats of physical violence or intimidating conduct. It concluded that deliberate indifference to an employee’s safety, without more, does not establish Bane Act coercion. Because the court had previously dismissed the claim on the same ground, it denied leave to amend as futile. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the Bane Act claim and denied leave to amend. It expressly did not reach whether the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule would also bar the claim.