Mackay v. City of Salinas

Background

Jeffrey Mackay sued the City of Salinas and eight individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against government officials for violating constitutional rights. He alleged that officers violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force during his arrest, including two taser deployments, punches, and kicks. He also brought a claim alleging that officers deliberately fabricated police reports and a claim that the City failed to train its officers adequately.

The officers pursued Mackay after he drove away from a traffic stop, drove through stop signs and red lights, reached speeds of up to 80 miles per hour, and drove against traffic on a one-way street. After his vehicle ran out of gas, Mackay continued fleeing on foot. Officers Garcia and Puckett used tasers while Mackay was climbing a fence. After Mackay fell, officers struck and kicked him for about 18 seconds. Mackay testified that he was not resisting, while Officers Mitchell and Urrutia stated that they were using compliance strikes because he would not give up his hands and might have had a weapon.

Mackay had pleaded no contest to fleeing a peace officer and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The factual basis for the resisting conviction stated that he had evaded officers while driving against traffic and later failed to stop and comply with commands while on foot. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which is a request to decide claims without a trial because the evidence allegedly leaves no important factual dispute. Mackay opposed only part of the motion and agreed to dismiss his claims against officers who did not use force and his claim against the City for inadequate training.

Court’s Analysis

The court first considered the rule commonly called the Heck bar. That rule prevents a person from using a civil-rights damages case to undermine an earlier criminal conviction. The court held that Mackay had specifically limited his resisting plea to his flight and failure to stop, so the court would not assume that the plea covered every event described in the police report.

The court held that Heck barred Mackay’s excessive-force claims concerning the tasers. Mackay was still fleeing and failing to comply with commands when Garcia and Puckett deployed the tasers. The court concluded that finding this use of force unlawful would necessarily conflict with Mackay’s plea admission that the officers were performing their duties while he failed to stop and comply. The court therefore granted summary judgment to Garcia and Puckett on the taser-related excessive-force claim.

The court reached a different conclusion about the punches and kicks. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mackay, it treated the alleged strikes as occurring after he had stopped running, fallen, and was no longer resisting. Because Mackay’s plea covered his flight on foot but did not admit that officers were performing their duties lawfully after he stopped running, the court found that Heck did not bar the claim against Mitchell and Urrutia.

The court then considered qualified immunity, a protection that can shield government officials from damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court found a genuine factual dispute about whether punching and kicking Mackay while he was on the ground and not resisting was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It also found that existing law gave Mitchell and Urrutia fair notice that such conduct could be unconstitutional. The court therefore denied summary judgment to those officers on the punches-and-kicks claim.

The court rejected the defendants’ Heck argument against Mackay’s claim that they fabricated police reports. Mackay challenged particular statements, including statements about an alleged ramming attempt and what officers did after he said he was done. The court found that success on this claim would not necessarily invalidate Mackay’s convictions. However, the court granted summary judgment on the claim because Mackay had not produced evidence meeting the required standard for deliberate fabrication, such as evidence that officers continued investigating despite knowing he was innocent or used investigative methods they knew would produce false information.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment on Mackay’s Second Claim for Relief, the deliberate-fabrication claim, and Third Claim for Relief, the Monell claim against the City for inadequate training. It also granted summary judgment on the First Claim for Relief, the excessive-force claim, in favor of Officers David Puckett, Edgar Garcia, Ryan Keating, Clifton Smith, Jose Luis Fletes, and Robert Hernandez. It denied summary judgment on the excessive-force claim as to Officers Jordy Urrutia and Cameron Mitchell.