R.W. v. Kijakazi
- Virginia Demarchi
- 5:21-cv-00152
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 8
In R.W. v. Kijakazi, Judge Demarchi denied R.W.’s motion and granted the Commissioner’s, finding proper consideration of borderline age.
R.W. and the Commissioner of Social Security; the ruling left the denial of R.W.’s disability insurance benefits in place.
What happened
In R.W. v. Kijakazi, R.W. challenged the denial of her disability benefits. She argued that the administrative law judge did not properly consider that she was close to moving into a higher age category when deciding whether she could work.
The court ruled that the administrative law judge considered her age as required. The judge noted R.W.’s age category, recognized that it would change soon after her last insured date, and considered her age, education, work experience, and work limitations with a vocational expert’s testimony. The court also said agency manuals did not require a separate written explanation.
The court denied R.W.’s summary judgment motion and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, leaving the benefits denial in place. Judge Virginia K. Demarchi ordered judgment entered and the case closed.
The detailed version
- R.W. v. Kijakazi · No. 5:21-cv-00152
- Virginia Demarchi
- Aug. 9, 2022
Background
R.W. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which asks the court to decide whether the administrative decision should stand based on the record.
R.W. filed her current application in May 2017, alleging disability beginning April 15, 2017. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that she was insured through December 31, 2018; had not engaged in substantial work since the alleged onset date; and had severe impairments including migraine headaches, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, bipolar disorder, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The ALJ found that R.W. could perform less than a full range of light work with additional limitations, could not perform her past relevant work, but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
As of her last insured date, R.W. was 54 and approximately 4.5 months from turning 55. The Social Security regulations place people ages 50 through 54 in the category “closely approaching advanced age” and people 55 or older in the “advanced age” category. R.W. argued that the ALJ mechanically used the lower category and failed to consider whether the higher category should apply. The Commissioner argued that the ALJ sufficiently considered R.W.’s age and the other vocational factors.
Legal standard and analysis
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court reviewed whether the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence or rested on improper legal standards. At step five of the disability analysis, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform other work available in significant numbers, considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.
The court explained that the regulations prohibit mechanically applying age categories in a borderline situation. They require an ALJ to consider whether to use the older category after evaluating the overall effect of the factors in the claimant’s case. The court relied on Lockwood v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, which held that an ALJ need not explain in a written decision why the older category was not used, although the ALJ must consider whether to use it.
The court found that the ALJ satisfied that requirement. The ALJ mentioned R.W.’s birthdate and age category, cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563, acknowledged that her age category changed shortly after the last insured date, and evaluated her age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity while relying on vocational-expert testimony. The court also held that the Social Security Administration’s HALLEX and POMS policy manuals did not impose judicially enforceable duties requiring a more detailed explanation.
Disposition
The court concluded that substantial evidence showed the ALJ considered R.W.’s borderline age as required by the regulation and Lockwood. It therefore held that remand was not warranted.
The court denied R.W.’s summary judgment motion and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The clerk was ordered to enter judgment and close the file.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.