Pineda Vargas v. Mattke

Background

Felix Pineda Vargas, Silvia Jiminez Rodriguez, and Diego Pineda sued Justin Mattke, the City of Greenfield, and several unidentified officers. The lawsuit arose from the execution of a no-knock search warrant at plaintiffs’ home around 4:30 a.m. on June 6, 2021. The warrant targeted Jesus Gonzalez, but plaintiffs alleged that Gonzalez had not lived at the home since at least May 1, 2021.

Plaintiffs alleged that officers did not show them the warrant, detained Vargas and Rodriguez inside, took Pineda outside, forced them to keep their heads down, searched their home and four cars, and took $200 from Rodriguez’s wallet without providing a receipt. Plaintiffs also alleged that officers continued the detention and search after learning they had the wrong resident identification. The complaint asserted negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, trespass, conversion, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims under California’s Ralph Act and Bane Act.

Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but did not accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences.

Section 1983 claim against Mattke

Plaintiffs alleged that Mattke knew or should have known that information he provided to obtain the warrant was incorrect. They also clarified that their Section 1983 claim against Mattke was based on obtaining the warrant, even though Mattke was not alleged to have participated in executing the search.

The court explained that an official may be liable under Section 1983 for causing a constitutional violation only if the official was an “integral participant.” Under the test discussed by the court, that requires allegations that the official either knew about and accepted constitutionally defective conduct as part of a common plan, or set in motion acts that the official knew or reasonably should have known would cause the constitutional injury.

The court understood the complaint to identify excessive force during the search as the constitutional injury. It held that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Mattke was an integral participant in the excessive force as the search was carried out. The court noted, however, that plaintiffs suggested at the hearing that executing the improper warrant itself was excessive force. The motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against Mattke was granted with leave to amend, and plaintiffs were directed to clarify which theory they were pursuing.

Section 1983 claim against the City and Doe defendants

Plaintiffs conceded that they had not alleged sufficient facts for municipal liability against the City under Monell, the rule requiring a constitutional violation to result from a municipality’s official policy or custom. The motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against the City was granted.

Because plaintiffs were still determining the names of the officers who executed the warrant, the court granted leave to amend the Section 1983 claim as to the Doe defendants.

Negligence claim

The court explained that negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress are separate causes of action and directed plaintiffs to specify which one they intended to allege. The court analyzed a negligence claim. Plaintiffs identified several allegedly negligent acts, some involving Mattke and others involving the Doe officers.

The court concluded that it was unclear whether plaintiffs claimed that the negligent injury was caused by the way the search was conducted or by the search’s occurrence itself. Because causation would differ depending on the theory, the motion to dismiss the negligence claim was granted with leave to amend. The court also granted leave to amend the negligence claim as to the Doe defendants.

Other claims

The complaint did not allege that Mattke committed assault or battery, conversion, or violence or intimidation covered by the Ralph Act. The claims against the City were based on vicarious liability for individual officers. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the assault-and-battery, conversion, Ralph Act, and Bane Act claims, in each instance with leave to amend. The court directed plaintiffs to identify which plaintiff was asserting the conversion claim.

The Bane Act claim also lacked allegations that Mattke interfered with plaintiffs’ rights through threat, intimidation, or coercion. The Ralph Act claim lacked allegations of violence or intimidation by threat of violence by Mattke, including violence motivated by racial or national-origin animus.

Order and effect

The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend. Plaintiffs were required to file an amended complaint by Friday, January 13, 2023. The order stated that failure to meet the deadline or cure the deficiencies identified by the court would result in dismissal with prejudice of the deficient claims. The order did not itself state that the claims were dismissed with prejudice.