R.K. v. Kijakazi

Background

R.K. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for supplemental security income. He alleged disability beginning May 1, 2013. The administrative law judge found that R.K. had severe physical impairments, including bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, human immunodeficiency virus, HIV-related neuropathy, sciatica, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The administrative law judge found that his depressive disorder and history of substance abuse were not severe, assessed a residual functional capacity for less than the full range of light work, and concluded that he could perform his past work as a taxicab dispatcher. The Appeals Council denied review.

R.K. argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated medical opinions, incorrectly found that his mental impairments were not severe, and failed to give adequate reasons for discounting his statements about the intensity and limiting effects of his symptoms. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

Medical-opinion evidence

Because R.K.’s claim was filed before March 27, 2017, the court applied the rules then governing treating, examining, and non-examining medical opinions. Those rules generally give greater weight to treating physicians and require adequate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting opinions.

The court held that the administrative law judge did not provide sufficient reasons for giving little weight to the opinions of treating physician Samantha Bessega, M.D. The administrative law judge stated that Bessega’s opinions were inconsistent with objective findings and the record as a whole, but did not adequately identify the findings or explain the inconsistency. The court also found that the administrative law judge did not sufficiently explain why R.K.’s activities, including attending school, volunteering, and traveling, conflicted with Bessega’s opinions. The record showed that R.K. attended school for only ten to fifteen hours per week and received accommodations and other support.

The court likewise held that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain why she gave little weight to treating physician Katerina Christopoulos, M.D. The administrative law judge relied on R.K.’s attendance at and enjoyment of school, but the court found that those facts were not inherently inconsistent with Christopoulos’s opinions, particularly because R.K. received school accommodations.

The court also found the reasons for discounting consulting psychologist Caroline Salvador-Moses, Psy.D.’s opinion insufficient. The administrative law judge described the opinion as overly restrictive, unsupported by other evidence, and based on a one-time examination, but did not identify the conflicting evidence or explain the conclusion. The court stated that a one-time examination, by itself, was not a sufficient reason to reject an examining doctor’s opinion.

Finally, the court held that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain her rejection of state-agency consultant Robert Liss, Ph.D.’s opinion. The administrative law judge relied on R.K.’s activities, his testimony that depression was not “crippling,” and improvement with medication. The court found that R.K.’s activities were performed with support and accommodations, that his testimony was not necessarily inconsistent with mild-to-moderate limitations, and that improvement in depression did not necessarily show the ability to function effectively in a workplace. The court therefore found insufficient reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Liss’s opinion.

Mental impairments

The administrative law judge found that R.K.’s depressive disorder and history of substance abuse caused no more than mild limitations in the four broad areas used to evaluate mental functioning. The court noted that the administrative law judge mischaracterized R.K.’s depression as depressive disorder not otherwise specified, despite diagnoses of recurrent major depressive disorder by medical providers. The court stated that the summary of treatment records was generally accurate but could not determine that the error in evaluating R.K.’s depression was harmless because the administrative law judge had not properly evaluated the medical opinions, including those of Salvador-Moses and Liss.

R.K.’s testimony

The court found that the administrative law judge did not identify specifically which of R.K.’s testimony she rejected or what evidence undermined each allegation. The administrative law judge relied in part on R.K.’s trip abroad, reported work or volunteer activities, and school attendance. The court held that merely engaging in those activities did not establish that R.K. spent a substantial part of his day performing functions transferable to a work setting. The court also noted evidence that R.K. had difficulty walking during the trip, received support and accommodations, performed about an hour of dishwashing per day at a residential program, and made only a brief attempt to deliver food.

Disposition

The court concluded that the administrative law judge erred in evaluating the medical opinions, R.K.’s mental impairments, and his subjective-symptom allegations. It directed the administrative law judge on remand to reconsider and weigh the medical opinions with adequate explanations, which could require reconsideration of the severity of R.K.’s major depressive disorder at the second step of the disability analysis and reconsideration of R.K.’s symptom allegations.

The court determined that the record did not require a finding that R.K. was disabled even if the evidence were properly evaluated. It therefore granted R.K.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file.