A.H. v. Kijakazi

Background

A.H. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. He alleged disability beginning May 15, 2014, based on back problems, diabetes, high blood pressure, insomnia, high cholesterol, and elbow problems. His application was initially denied, and an administrative law judge later found that he was not disabled.

In a prior related proceeding, the court reversed that decision and sent the matter back for further administrative proceedings because the administrative law judge had not addressed treating physician Dr. James Luu’s opinion about A.H.’s mental impairments. On remand, a different administrative law judge again found that A.H. was not disabled. The administrative law judge found severe impairments involving degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol, but found depression to be nonsevere and found no medically determinable elbow problems or insomnia.

The administrative law judge determined that A.H. retained the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his impairments—to perform medium work with limits, including standing and walking for six of eight hours, sitting for six of eight hours, and specified limits on lifting, climbing, balancing, and other activities. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the administrative law judge found that A.H. could perform his past work as a computer numerical control machine operator, both as he performed it and as that job is generally performed in the national economy.

Issues and analysis

A.H. raised four primary challenges: the evaluation of Dr. Luu’s medical opinions, the evaluation of A.H.’s subjective testimony, the evaluation of lay-witness statements from his friend K. Truong, and the residual-functional-capacity finding that he could return to his past work. A.H. also argued that the administrative law judge failed to include mental limitations in the residual functional capacity.

Medical opinions

The court held that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s decision to give Dr. Luu’s physical- and mental-impairment opinions less weight than the opinions of other physicians and psychologists. Because Dr. Luu’s opinions were contradicted by other evidence, the administrative law judge was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.

For the physical opinions, the administrative law judge relied on the lack of significant objective clinical findings in Dr. Luu’s treatment notes, substantially normal physical examinations, conservative treatment, and A.H.’s largely intact daily activities. The administrative law judge gave greater weight to the opinions of reviewing physicians Drs. G. Lee and A. Volterra and examining physician Dr. Tomas Rios, whose opinions were supported by objective findings and other evidence.

For the mental opinions, the administrative law judge found that Dr. Luu’s treatment notes did not contain significant mental-status findings and did not reflect the onset or duration of the severe depression described in Dr. Luu’s letter. The administrative law judge also considered A.H.’s intact daily activities, the absence of specialized mental-health treatment, and the opinions of psychologists Sally Rowley and Robert Liss and psychiatrist Dr. Antoinette Acenas. The court concluded that these were adequate reasons to give Dr. Luu’s mental-health opinion less weight. It also upheld the finding that A.H.’s depression was nonsevere and that the administrative law judge’s finding of mild mental limitations was reflected in the residual functional capacity assessment.

A.H.’s testimony

The court held that the administrative law judge gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting A.H.’s testimony about the intensity and limiting effects of his symptoms. The administrative law judge relied on medical records that did not show serious abnormalities, imaging showing only mild degenerative disc disease without a compression fracture or vertebral slippage, substantially normal findings during Dr. Rios’s examination, conservative treatment with over-the-counter medication, and largely intact daily activities.

The court rejected A.H.’s argument that the administrative law judge was insufficiently specific. The administrative law judge summarized A.H.’s testimony, identified evidence in the record, and explained why that evidence was inconsistent with the claimed severity of his symptoms. The court also found that the administrative law judge did not improperly rely on daily activities because she stated that those activities were not determinative of the ability to work but provided insight into A.H.’s functioning.

Lay-witness statements

The court upheld the administrative law judge’s treatment of K. Truong’s statements. Truong reported that A.H. had difficulty with physical work, could lift less than 10 pounds, and could walk only a short distance, while also reporting that A.H. could drive, shop, and regularly go to the library and church. The administrative law judge accepted the statements as sincere observations of A.H.’s daily activities but found that they did not support greater limitations than those included in the residual functional capacity.

The court found that inconsistency with the objective medical evidence and other evidence was a valid reason specific to the witness for discounting the statements. The court did not rely on the Commissioner’s suggestion that some statements appeared to be written from A.H.’s perspective.

Residual functional capacity and past work

The court rejected A.H.’s argument that his six-hour standing and walking limitation necessarily prevented him from performing medium work or his past job. The court found that the vocational expert did not testify that a person who could stand for only six of eight hours could not perform medium work. The court also noted the Social Security Administration’s longstanding interpretation that medium work can include a six-hour standing and walking restriction.

The court further explained that A.H. could be found able to perform his past work as it is generally performed in the national economy, even if his own prior performance of the job involved different demands. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s step-four determination.

Disposition

The court denied A.H.’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case.