Escamilla v. Echelon Communities, LLC

Background

Eduardo Escamilla and Luisa Cordero alleged that Echelon Communities, LLC failed to accommodate Escamilla’s disability by seeking to terminate their tenancy at a mobilehome park. The dispute concerned repairs to their mobilehome, a permit issued by the California Department of Housing and Community Development, a registration decal, and Echelon’s notices requiring compliance and later requiring the plaintiffs to vacate.

The plaintiffs alleged that Escamilla’s serious health problems, including kidney failure and the need for frequent dialysis, made it difficult for him to complete the permit process. They also alleged that Cordero was caring for Escamilla while working and running the couple’s restaurant. After Echelon issued a sixty-day notice to vacate, the plaintiffs asked Echelon to rescind it as a disability accommodation. They alleged that they later obtained a new permit, finalized it through an inspection, and obtained a replacement decal, but Echelon refused to rescind the notice or engage in an interactive process.

The operative First Amended Complaint asserted claims under the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The court had previously dismissed the original complaint’s disability-accommodation claims but allowed amendment. The court had also dismissed a retaliatory-eviction claim, which was not included in the amended complaint.

Motion to Substitute

Escamilla died of cardiac arrest while the case was pending. Cordero moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) to substitute herself as Escamilla’s successor in interest. The court found the motion timely, determined that the federal and state housing-discrimination claims survived Escamilla’s death, and concluded that Cordero was the proper successor under California community-property and intestate-succession principles.

The court therefore granted Cordero’s motion to substitute. It also ordered that she did not need to file another amended complaint and deemed the existing First Amended Complaint to be brought by Cordero both individually and as Escamilla’s successor in interest. The order did not decide whether particular categories of damages survived Escamilla’s death.

Motion to Dismiss

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, without resolving disputed facts.

To state a Fair Housing Amendments Act claim for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must allege a disability, the defendant’s knowledge of it, the necessity of an accommodation for equal use and enjoyment of the dwelling, the accommodation’s reasonableness, and the defendant’s refusal to provide it.

The court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged requests for accommodation. The allegations included Escamilla’s request for more time after telling Echelon’s manager about his health problems, two letters from counsel requesting rescission of the notice to vacate as a disability accommodation, and a later request to Echelon’s owner.

The court also held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged necessity. Their allegations described delays involving communications with an inspector, replacement of an expired permit, scheduling an inspection, and obtaining a replacement decal. The court found it reasonable at the pleading stage to infer that Escamilla’s disability and medical treatment contributed to the delays and affected Cordero’s ability to resolve the issues while caring for him and working.

The court further held that the requested accommodations could be reasonable. The possible accommodations were additional time to resolve the permit and decal issues before the notice to vacate and rescission of that notice after the plaintiffs complied. Whether those accommodations were reasonable was fact-specific and better addressed on a factual record. The court noted that the plaintiffs alleged there had been no state enforcement action or imminent legal consequence requiring termination of the tenancy, although Echelon could raise its arguments later.

The court therefore denied Echelon’s motion to dismiss the federal claim. Because the FEHA claim involved substantially similar rights and analysis, and because the federal claim remained pending, the court also denied Echelon’s request to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim. The conclusion states that Echelon’s Motion to Dismiss was denied.