Birkeland v. Jorgenson

Background

Dean A. Birkeland, trustee for the next of kin of John O. Birkeland, sued John Edward Jorgenson, Kyle Eckert, John Robert Adams, and the City of Roseville. The lawsuit followed the February 10, 2016 shooting death of John O. Birkeland inside his Roseville apartment.

Two neighbors called 911 requesting a welfare check after hearing screaming, cursing, breaking glass, and objects being thrown. Officers arrived, heard concerning sounds, and repeatedly asked Birkeland to open the door. Birkeland said he was fine, said he had been robbed, and eventually stopped responding. The officers knew he had a misdemeanor arrest warrant but agreed that the warrant did not permit an arrest in his home after 10:00 p.m. Sergeant Adams eventually authorized forcible entry so officers could check Birkeland’s well-being.

After entering, officers searched for Birkeland and found him crouched in a bedroom closet. Officer Jorgensen warned that a police dog would bite him and then sent the dog into the closet. The dog bit Birkeland’s knee, and Birkeland stabbed the dog with a knife. Officers Jorgensen and Eckert fired their weapons. Jorgensen testified that Birkeland lunged toward him with the knife, but the parties disputed whether Birkeland came out of the closet on his own or was pulled out by the dog. Birkeland died from his injuries.

Claims and legal standards

Birkeland asserted claims under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful entry, police-dog deployment, and deadly force. He also asserted punitive-damages, failure-to-supervise, municipal-policy or training, assault, battery, vicarious-liability, and wrongful-death claims.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Birkeland as the nonmoving party.

The individual officers asserted qualified immunity, which protects public officials from personal liability unless their conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established when the conduct occurred. For the state-law claims, the officers asserted official immunity, which generally protects public officials performing discretionary duties unless they acted willfully or maliciously.

Rulings on the federal claims

Apartment entry. The court held that the warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Based on the neighbors’ reports, the sounds officers heard, Birkeland’s inconsistent assurances, his statements that he had been robbed, his refusal to open the door, and the later lack of communication, the officers reasonably believed that an emergency might exist. The court also found that the entry and search were limited to locating Birkeland and confirming that he was not in danger. The officers therefore received qualified immunity on the unlawful-entry claim.

Police dog. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that deploying the dog to locate and bite Birkeland inside his apartment was objectively unreasonable. The court emphasized that the officers were conducting a welfare check in a confined apartment, rather than pursuing a person suspected of a crime in an outdoor area. But the court also held that Birkeland had not identified controlling authority or a sufficiently strong body of persuasive cases clearly establishing that the dog deployment was unlawful in these circumstances. The officers therefore received qualified immunity on this claim.

Deadly force. The court denied summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim based on the shooting. It found factual disputes about whether the officers reasonably believed Birkeland had committed the crimes identified by the defendants and whether he moved toward the officers with the knife in a way that created an immediate threat. The court noted evidence that the dog remained between the officers and Birkeland, may have been trying to bite him again, and may have affected his movements. A reasonable jury could therefore find that the deadly force was not objectively reasonable. If the jury found that Birkeland’s movement did not create an immediate threat, the use of deadly force would violate clearly established law.

Failure to supervise. Sergeant Adams received qualified immunity on the failure-to-supervise claim. He did not fire his weapon, did not order the shooting, and was not in the bedroom when Birkeland was shot. The record also lacked evidence that Adams knew of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by Officers Jorgensen or Eckert.

Municipal-policy claim. The City received summary judgment on the claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court found no evidence of a widespread policy or custom of unconstitutional canine use or deadly force, and no evidence that the City had prior notice that its training or supervision was inadequate.

Punitive damages. The defendants received summary judgment on the punitive-damages claim. The court found that the record did not suggest that Officers Jorgensen or Eckert acted with reckless or callous indifference to Birkeland’s federally protected rights or with an evil motive. The court stated that it would consider a motion for reconsideration if trial evidence later suggested otherwise.

Rulings on the state-law claims

The officers received official immunity for state-law claims based on entering the apartment and deploying the police dog because no reasonable fact-finder could conclude on the record that their conduct concerning those actions was willful or malicious.

The court reached a different result for the assault and battery claims based on the shooting. Because a reasonable jury could find the deadly force unreasonable, and because the officers intentionally used force while exercising discretion, the question whether they acted willfully or maliciously remained for the jury. The officers therefore were not entitled to official immunity on those claims to the extent they were based on the deadly force.

The City received vicarious official immunity for the state-law claims insofar as they were based on the officers’ entry into the apartment and deployment of the police dog. The order uses the phrase “entitled to vicarious liability” in stating this disposition, while the discussion describes the result as vicarious official immunity.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The entry, police-dog, failure-to-supervise, municipal-policy, and punitive-damages rulings favored the defendants. The Fourth Amendment deadly-force claim remained, as did the related state-law assault and battery claims based on the shooting. The court characterized the deadly-force issue as a close case and encouraged the parties to attempt settlement.

Judge Donovan W. Frank signed the memorandum opinion and order on May 1, 2019.