Heard v. City of Red Wing

Background

At about 7:00 p.m. on August 7, 2016, the Red Wing police department received an anonymous 9-1-1 call about people parking on Putnam Avenue to obtain drugs from another house. The caller provided no further information and did not identify a particular vehicle or person.

Officer Nick Sather, who knew the area and knew there was a “drug house” on Putnam Avenue, drove through the area. He saw an unfamiliar silver vehicle, turned around to stop it, and could not catch up. He believed the vehicle was trying to elude him and asked other officers to watch for it.

Officer Justin Hesse later saw a vehicle matching Sather’s description parked outside a house on West Sixth Street. Heard got out of the driver’s side with her brother and walked toward the house. Hesse activated his squad-car lights, followed Heard, and told her that police had received a driving complaint. Heard continued toward the house, and Hesse eventually directed her back into the yard.

Less than a minute later, the officers handcuffed Heard. Heard maintained that she said she would “sue the fck out y’all,” while Sather apparently believed she said she would “shoot the fck out y’all.” Heard’s brother’s cellphone video captured him saying that she had said “sue.” The officers took Heard to the ground while handcuffing her. Sather told her that she was under arrest for terroristic threats and obstruction. She was later taken to an emergency room and then to the county jail, where she remained for two days. The county attorney dismissed the charges of obstructing legal process, disorderly conduct, and threats of violence. Heard claimed that the takedown caused a shoulder injury requiring surgery and continuing pain.

Claims and motions

Heard asserted five counts. Counts 1 through 3 were claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state or local officials for violations of federal rights. Count 1 alleged First Amendment retaliation against Hesse and Sather. Count 2 alleged unreasonable seizure and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Count 3 alleged unreasonable seizure, false arrest, post-arrest detention, and malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. Counts 4 and 5 asserted state-law claims for battery and malicious prosecution against the officers and the City.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that qualified immunity and official immunity barred Heard’s claims. Heard moved for partial summary judgment on her Fourth Amendment claims. The court denied both motions.

Initial stop and qualified immunity

A brief investigative detention, often called a Terry stop, requires a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the specific person stopped of criminal activity. The court determined that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, showed that Hesse and Sather lacked particularized reasonable suspicion to stop or question Heard.

The court distinguished cases involving reports of clearly criminal activity, specific vehicles, nighttime circumstances, or additional facts suggesting that a vehicle was connected to a crime. Here, the caller had not reported a specific crime in progress, had not identified Heard’s vehicle, and had not provided details about the alleged drug activity. The court noted that Heard had not violated any traffic laws, that the encounter occurred at 7:00 p.m., and that the vehicle’s unfamiliarity to Sather was not enough. The court also treated Sather’s belief that the vehicle was trying to elude him as the only fact that could possibly suggest suspicious activity.

The court held that the initial stop violated Heard’s constitutional rights and that the relevant right was clearly established before August 2016. It therefore ruled that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for the initial encounter.

Excessive force

The court analyzed the excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard. That standard considers the severity of the suspected offense, whether the person posed an immediate threat, and whether she was resisting or trying to flee.

Because officers generally may not use force to seize someone whom they had no right to detain, the lack of reasonable suspicion was significant. But the court found factual disputes about what happened after the initial encounter. In particular, the factfinder must determine whether Heard said “sue” or “shoot” and how an objectively reasonable officer would have understood her statement. Those factual findings could affect whether her response gave the officers an independent basis to arrest her and use force. The court therefore could not resolve the excessive-force issue on summary judgment.

Retaliatory arrest

The court explained that a retaliatory-arrest claim cannot proceed when the arrest was supported by probable cause. It found factual disputes about whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Heard after her statements. For that reason, summary judgment on the retaliation claim was not appropriate.

Official immunity and state-law claims

Under Minnesota law, official immunity can protect public officials performing discretionary duties unless they commit a willful or malicious wrong. The court concluded that, because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop or detain Heard, official immunity did not bar her state-law claims at that stage. However, factual disputes about what occurred after the initial encounter meant that the ultimate application of official immunity had to await the factfinder’s determinations.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was DENIED and that Heard’s motion for partial summary judgment was DENIED.