Lopez v. Barr

Background

The plaintiffs were noncitizens in removal proceedings at the Fort Snelling immigration court. They sought to challenge Matter of Castro-Tum, a 2018 Attorney General decision holding that immigration judges generally could not pause removal cases through administrative closure unless a regulation or court-approved settlement authorized that action.

The plaintiffs alleged that administrative closure was necessary for them to apply for provisional unlawful-presence waivers. They alleged that the defendants’ issuance and enforcement of Castro-Tum violated the Administrative Procedure Act and their Fifth Amendment rights. They also sought a new regulation allowing noncitizens in removal proceedings to qualify for those waivers. An immigration judge had denied each plaintiff’s motion to administratively close his removal case in December 2019.

Motion and jurisdictional rules

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which allows dismissal when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction—the legal authority to hear the case. Because the defendants made a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the court considered whether the amended complaint adequately alleged a basis for jurisdiction and accepted its factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion.

The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) barred district-court review. That provision channels questions of law and fact, including constitutional and statutory challenges, arising from removal proceedings into judicial review of a final removal order. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenge to Castro-Tum arose from their removal proceedings because Castro-Tum operates only in that setting and affected the immigration judge’s denial of their requests to pause those proceedings.

The court also held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) supplied an additional jurisdictional bar. That provision limits review of claims arising from decisions or actions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. The court treated administrative closure as analogous to recalendaring because both are procedural tools for pausing or restarting a removal case. It therefore concluded that the immigration judge’s denial of administrative closure was an administrative determination linked to adjudicating removal proceedings, and that the plaintiffs’ claims arose from that determination.

Disposition

The court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. It granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and ordered that the action be dismissed without prejudice. The opinion stated that the plaintiffs were not permanently barred from meaningful judicial review; instead, it stated that they could assert their challenges after final removal orders and then petition the Eighth Circuit for review.

Chief Judge John R. Tunheim signed the memorandum opinion and order on January 20, 2021.