Spencer v. United States Department of Justice

Background

Frederick Dwayne Spencer was indicted by a grand jury on May 21, 2007, along with several codefendants, on federal money-laundering charges. The indictment alleged that he conducted financial transactions to pay a construction company for remodeling a business, using proceeds from unlawful activity involving cocaine and crack cocaine. Spencer pleaded not guilty, went to trial in September 2007, and was acquitted by a jury.

In March 2023, Spencer filed this civil action against the United States Department of Justice and Merrick Garland. He alleged that his 2007 prosecution violated his constitutional rights because he had not been indicted by a grand jury. He sought monetary damages and argued that he could recover under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, a decision recognizing certain damages claims against federal officials for constitutional violations. Spencer represented himself.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim for relief. In deciding that motion, the court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and views reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. The court may also consider public records and materials necessarily embraced by the complaint.

Grand Jury and Indictment

The Fifth Amendment generally requires a grand-jury presentment or indictment before a person may be held to answer for a serious federal crime. The court took judicial notice—accepted an established fact from the court’s own records—that Spencer had been indicted by a grand jury in 2007. The court noted that this fact had also been acknowledged in an earlier related appeal.

The court found that Spencer’s allegation that he had not been indicted was plainly false. It also found no indication that the indictment was constitutionally defective. The indictment identified the money-laundering charges against Spencer, specified which counts applied to him, described the nature and circumstances of the alleged crimes, and included dates and amounts of money involved. The court concluded that the indictment both gave Spencer enough information to prepare his defense and protected him against a later prosecution for the same offense. The court therefore ruled that his Fifth Amendment right to a grand-jury indictment was not violated.

Bivens Damages Claim

The court separately held that Spencer’s reliance on Bivens did not support his damages claim. A Bivens claim is a limited type of lawsuit seeking damages from federal officials for certain constitutional violations. The court explained that such a claim cannot be brought against the Department of Justice because it is a federal agency rather than a government official.

Because Spencer’s complaint did not specify whether he sued Garland in his individual or official capacity, the court presumed that he sued Garland in his official capacity. An official-capacity claim is treated as a claim against the official’s office. The court therefore treated the claim against Garland as a claim against the Department of Justice, which could not be sued for damages under Bivens on these allegations.

Disposition

The court held that Spencer had not plausibly stated a claim for relief. It granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and ordered that the action be dismissed with prejudice. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.