Aden v. City of Bloomington, Minnesota

Background

A foot chase ended with Isak Abdirahman Aden sitting on a curb while holding a gun and, at times, pointing it at his own head. More than 80 officers from eight police forces surrounded him. After several hours of negotiations, Aden put the gun on the ground and moved roughly one and a half to two feet away from it. The negotiators believed they were making progress.

Without telling the negotiators, supervising officers approved a surprise tactical plan. Three flashbang grenades were detonated near Aden, and officers fired 40 mm foam rounds at him. The plan was intended to startle Aden and cause him to move away from the gun. Instead, Aden reached for it. Five officers then fired lethal rounds, killing him. The parties disputed whether Aden pointed the gun toward officers or merely reached toward it while moving toward the ground.

Sumaya Aden, as next-of-kin and trustee for the estate, asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, municipal liability, and other state-law claims. The defendants sought summary judgment, which would end a claim when the evidence shows no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Less-Lethal Force and Qualified Immunity

Count II alleged that the use of flashbangs and 40 mm foam rounds violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The court held that Officers Peterson, Ryan, Nelson, Kiehl, and Stier could not remain defendants on Count II because they did not deploy the less-lethal weapons and did not supervise or make decisions about that tactical plan. Count II remained against Supervising Defendants Chief Roger New, Lieutenant Andrew Speakman, and Sergeant Corey Cardenas.

The court rejected the argument that Minnesota’s wrongful-death statute barred the estate’s claims involving the less-lethal force. It also denied qualified immunity to the Supervising Defendants on Count II. Viewing the evidence in the estate’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that Aden posed no immediate threat when the planned force was used: he was seated, was not holding the gun, was not threatening anyone, was surrounded by heavily armed and protected officers, and was engaged in negotiations. The court further held that the right not to be subjected to this use of significant force when no immediate threat existed was clearly established by July 2, 2019.

Lethal Force and Qualified Immunity

Count I alleged that the five lethal-force officers violated the Fourth Amendment by shooting Aden. The court held that the relevant law was clearly established: possession of a gun alone generally does not establish an immediate threat of serious physical harm unless the person points it at someone or takes comparable menacing action.

The court found genuine factual disputes about whether Aden pointed the gun at officers, whether he moved toward them, and whether the officers faced an immediate threat of serious harm. The defendants’ evidence described Aden as standing, moving toward officers, and beginning to point the gun. The estate’s evidence, including video interpretations and expert opinions, supported a finding that Aden was hunched or on the ground, directed the gun toward the ground, and never pointed it at officers. Because a jury could find the lethal force objectively unreasonable, the court denied qualified immunity and denied summary judgment on Count I.

Other Claims

The court granted summary judgment on Count IV, the substantive due process claim against the Supervising Defendants. It held that the Fourth Amendment specifically governs claims based on the use of force, so the more general substantive due process theory was subsumed by the Fourth Amendment claim. Count IV was dismissed.

The court denied summary judgment on Count VI, the municipal-liability claim against the City of Eagan. The remaining theories concerned failure to supervise, condoning excessive force, and Chief New’s alleged decision to establish the city’s policy by authorizing the tactical plan. The court concluded that the claim could proceed because the Fourth Amendment claims against the officers survived and the estate presented evidence supporting its contention that Chief New was the city’s final policymaker for the use-of-force decision.

The court also denied summary judgment on Count VII, the negligence claim. Although public employees generally have official immunity for negligence involving discretionary acts, that protection can be lost for a willful or malicious wrong. The court found that factual disputes about whether the force was wrongful and legally unjustified prevented judgment for the defendants.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted to the extent that Count II was dismissed as asserted against Officers Peterson, Ryan, Nelson, Kiehl, and Stier, and Count IV was dismissed. The motion was otherwise denied. The court noted that the defendants had not sought summary judgment on the wrongful-death claim.