Perkins v. Perez

Background

Shakee Perkins, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Superintendent Ada Perez, Medical Director John Benheim, Correction Officers Richard Ulysse, Damon Travis, and Ryan Whelan, and Sergeant Fred Nameth. He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, in both their individual and official capacities, along with state-law tort claims.

Perkins alleged that Ulysse violently pulled and twisted his arm through his cell-door opening. He also alleged that Nameth delayed his medical care while questioning him; Dr. Benheim treated him with narcotics despite his refusal and without informed consent; Travis and Whelan used painful restraints and transported him improperly; Whelan smoked in the transport van; he was placed in poor conditions after returning from the hospital; and Ulysse later threatened retaliation if Perkins filed grievances. Perkins also alleged that other prison employees retaliated against him.

The court had previously dismissed most claims but allowed a First Amendment retaliation claim against Ulysse to continue. It gave Perkins an opportunity to amend. Perkins then filed a Second Amended Complaint, and the defendants renewed their motion to dismiss.

Legal Standard and Analysis

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim, and relied on the law-of-the-case doctrine. That doctrine generally means that a court follows its earlier rulings in the same case unless there is a compelling reason to revisit them.

The court found that the Second Amended Complaint was substantially the same as the earlier complaint except for allegations concerning Dr. Benheim. Because Perkins had not corrected the previously identified deficiencies, the court followed its earlier rulings for most claims.

Claims Against Perez

The court held that Perkins again did not allege that Perez personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations, created a policy or custom causing them, or acted with the required disregard of his complaints. The court therefore dismissed all claims against Perez with prejudice.

Claims Against Dr. Benheim

The earlier complaint had described a disagreement over medical treatment and had not adequately alleged denial of medical care. The Second Amended Complaint added allegations that Perkins expressly refused treatment, that Benheim treated him without informed consent, that Benheim failed to disclose potential risks, and that Perkins had a medical history involving cardiac arrhythmia.

The court explained that prisoners may have a Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medical treatment and to receive medical information relevant to that decision. Because the defendants did not address the new allegations or explain why treatment over Perkins’s objection was justified, the court allowed the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Benheim to proceed.

The court also allowed Perkins’s Eighth Amendment claims based on Benheim’s alleged intentional and punitive conduct to proceed. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court could not rule out a constitutional violation if Benheim injected narcotics against Perkins’s will to punish him and the injections caused the alleged symptoms. The ruling was without prejudice to the defendants raising related arguments later in the case.

Claims Against Nameth, Travis, and Whelan

The court dismissed all claims against Nameth with prejudice because the alleged delay in obtaining medical care was about twenty minutes and the Second Amended Complaint repeated the earlier allegations.

The court dismissed all claims against Travis and Whelan with prejudice. It found that the allegations about restraints, carrying Perkins to the van, and exposure to cigarette smoke did not cure the deficiencies identified in the earlier decision.

Official-Capacity and State-Law Claims

The court dismissed all official-capacity claims with prejudice because Perkins did not allege that a government policy, custom, policymaker, or failure to train caused his injuries.

The court again dismissed the state-law claims with prejudice. It stated that those claims had already been dismissed with prejudice and, independently, that the alleged intentional torts occurred between February 21 and March 6, 2014, while the initial complaint was not mailed until January 18, 2017. The court therefore concluded that the claims were time-barred.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss. It dismissed with prejudice the state-law claims, the claims against Perez, Nameth, Travis, and Whelan, and all official-capacity claims. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Dr. Benheim survived the motion. The individual-capacity claims against Ulysse were not challenged by this motion and therefore remained in effect.