Smolen v. Brown

Background

Samuel J. Smolen, Jr., an inmate at Sullivan Correctional Facility who represented himself, sued correctional officers, supervisors, an unknown nurse, an unknown inmate, and an inmate grievance supervisor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Smolen alleged that he filed a grievance about inmates monopolizing telephones and televisions; that C.O. Lawton P. Brown told one of those inmates, identified as Inmate Doe, about the grievance; and that Inmate Doe then struck Smolen, breaking his left eardrum. Smolen alleged that De La Rosa and Darden watched tension escalate but did nothing. He also alleged that Carrington struck him in the head while he was in a prison emergency room, that Nurse Doe declined to examine him or report the incident, and that Bodge did not arrange for his injuries to be treated or photographed. Smolen further alleged that Quick refused to file his grievances and denied his appeal.

The motion was filed by De La Rosa, Darden, Nevins, Bodge, and Quick under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Brown and Carrington did not join the motion. The court also stated that Inmate Doe and Nurse Doe were not parties because Inmate Doe had not been identified and Smolen had not amended the complaint to name the person identified as likely Nurse Doe.

Court’s analysis

Failure to protect from Inmate Doe’s assault. The court treated Smolen’s allegations against De La Rosa and Darden as an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Such a claim requires allegations that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that the officials knowingly disregarded that risk. The court held that Smolen alleged no prior altercation or threat involving Inmate Doe, did not allege that De La Rosa or Darden knew about the grievance that created the tension, and did not show that the alleged brief surprise attack gave them a realistic opportunity to intervene. The court therefore concluded that these allegations did not state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Claims concerning Carrington’s alleged assault. A § 1983 claim against an individual requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. The court held that the complaint did not allege that any moving defendant was present during Carrington’s alleged assault or otherwise personally involved. Nevins had left to obtain a replacement camera, Darden had recently left the room, and Bodge arrived after the incident. The court also found no reasonable basis to infer that Darden’s instruction that Smolen come out to use the bathroom showed involvement in the assault. The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against the moving defendants based on Carrington’s alleged assault.

Grievance-process claims. The court held that Quick’s alleged refusal to file Smolen’s grievances and denial of his appeal did not state a First Amendment access-to-courts claim because Smolen was able to bring this lawsuit. The court also held that prison grievance procedures do not create a substantive right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the allegations against Quick did not state a constitutional claim.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss. All claims against De La Rosa, Darden, Nevins, Bodge, and Quick were dismissed without prejudice because this was the first adjudication of those claims. The court allowed Smolen 30 days from the date of the opinion to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies. The court warned that failing to amend could result in dismissal with prejudice of the claims dismissed without prejudice. Claims against Brown and Carrington remained because they had not moved for dismissal.