Vivar v. New York City Police Department

Background

Felipe F. Vivar, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of New York, Angel Bussue, New York and Presbyterian Hospital, New York Gracie Square Hospital, Rebecca Kostopoulos, Self Help Community Services, Valerie Soto, Rivas Sears, Dino Diaz, and unidentified defendants. He alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, and various New York state-law claims arising from two incidents in 2018.

Vivar alleged that police officers entered his apartment without a warrant, searched it, and took him to a hospital against his will on June 21, 2018. He alleged that he was involuntarily hospitalized for more than 24 hours. He further alleged that, on August 3, 2018, police officers and Self Help workers entered his apartment, that Diaz falsely told police Vivar had tried to use a knife, and that Vivar was taken to Gracie Square Hospital and involuntarily hospitalized for ten days. He alleged that hospital personnel restrained and medicated him without his consent and denied requests for an inhaler.

Motions and Legal Standard

Four groups of defendants moved to dismiss some or all claims: New York and Presbyterian Hospital; the Gracie Square defendants; Self Help Community Services; and Soto, Sears, and Diaz. Because Soto, Sears, and Diaz had already answered, the court treated their motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying the same standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true and read Vivar’s submissions liberally because he was representing himself.

Federal Civil-Rights Claims

The court dismissed Vivar’s § 1983 claims against New York and Presbyterian Hospital, New York Gracie Square Hospital, and Kostopoulos. Vivar conceded that he had not alleged facts showing that Kostopoulos acted under color of state law or that either hospital had an official policy supporting liability under § 1983. The court also noted that private medical providers’ forced hospitalization and medication, standing alone, generally do not become government action merely because police transported a person to the hospital.

The court distinguished the claims against the Self Help defendants. It found Vivar’s allegations against Soto—principally that she insulted and mistreated him at a Self Help office—insufficient to show joint action with government actors. It also found that Vivar had not alleged facts establishing that Self Help itself could be held liable for its employees’ alleged constitutional violations through an official policy, policymaker decision, widespread practice, or deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.

The court nevertheless held that Vivar plausibly stated Fourth Amendment claims against Sears and Diaz. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Vivar alleged that police entered his apartment without a warrant or an emergency justification, searched the apartment, transported him to a hospital against his will, and caused or permitted property damage. He also alleged that Diaz falsely told police during the August incident that Vivar had used a knife and that Sears and Diaz acted with government employees to pressure him to stop making complaints. Taking those allegations as true at the motion stage, the court found they plausibly suggested joint action between Sears and Diaz, on one side, and government actors, on the other.

The court dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claims against Self Help, Soto, Sears, and Diaz. Vivar appeared to allege that these defendants worked with the Human Resources Administration to call police in retaliation for his 311 complaints. The court found that he had not alleged that the complaints involved protected speech or that the defendants’ actions actually chilled his speech. In particular, Vivar continued making 311 complaints after the June incident.

State-Law Claims and Supplemental Jurisdiction

The court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims because the surviving federal claims and the state claims arose from a connected chain of events involving Vivar’s removal from his apartment and hospital treatment. The court rejected the argument that the hospital events were too separate in time or substance from the events involving police and Self Help.

The following state-law claims survived: false arrest or false imprisonment against New York Gracie Square Hospital, Self Help, Sears, and Diaz; medical malpractice against New York and Presbyterian Hospital, New York Gracie Square Hospital, and Kostopoulos; battery against New York and Presbyterian Hospital, New York Gracie Square Hospital, and Kostopoulos; assault against New York Gracie Square Hospital; defamation against Sears, Diaz, and Self Help; and negligence against Soto, Sears, Diaz, and Self Help. The opinion also states that various claims against the unidentified defendants, Bussue, and the City of New York survived.

The court dismissed Vivar’s intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims because the alleged conduct fell within traditional tort claims such as false arrest, medical malpractice, assault, and battery. The court stated that the claims it dismissed were dismissed without prejudice.

Disposition

The motions filed by New York and Presbyterian Hospital, the Gracie Square defendants, Self Help, and Soto, Sears, and Diaz were granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed: (1) Vivar’s § 1983 claims against New York and Presbyterian Hospital, New York Gracie Square Hospital, and Kostopoulos; (2) his § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims against Self Help and Soto; (3) his § 1983 First Amendment claims against Self Help, Soto, Sears, and Diaz; and (4) his intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. The court left the other identified claims pending and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motions.