Velasquez v. City of New York Department of Buildings

Background

Jose Velasquez alleged that the New York City Department of Buildings and its Commissioner, Melanie La Rocca, discriminated against him based on race in connection with a Special Inspector Agency license. The license allowed holders to monitor and conduct certain construction-site inspections in New York City.

Velasquez’s license expired in 2017 after he did not renew it. The Department later informed him that he needed to apply for a new license. During its review, the Department determined that he had filed 42 special-inspection forms between May 20, 2017, and December 31, 2018, while he lacked a valid license. The Department treated those filings as false filings under its regulation and denied his new license application.

The Department also initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding. An administrative law judge recommended a two-year suspension of Velasquez’s self-certification privileges. Commissioner La Rocca accepted the factual findings but imposed a different penalty because Velasquez did not have self-certification privileges: a one-year suspension of his full filing privileges, disqualification from conducting special inspections, and exclusion from certain other programs.

Claims and Rule 12(b)(6) standard

Velasquez asserted claims directly under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough factual material to plausibly support a legal claim.

The court considered the complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated into it, as well as documents on which Velasquez relied in bringing the action.

Equal-protection claims

The court dismissed Velasquez’s equal-protection claims. It addressed two theories: selective enforcement of the licensing rules and discriminatory effects from the licensing scheme.

For selective enforcement, Velasquez had to plausibly allege both that he was treated differently from similarly situated people and that the difference was based on an improper consideration such as race. The court concluded that the four white engineers identified in the complaint were not adequate comparators. Two had been disciplined by a state agency rather than by the defendants. The complaint did not identify the public body that disciplined a third engineer. The fourth was disciplined by the Department, but the complaint did not allege that he had performed inspections without a valid license, as Velasquez had.

The court also concluded that Velasquez had not alleged race-based intent in a non-conclusory way. His allegations that Black engineers received harsher punishment did not identify specific discriminatory intent or racial animus by the defendants.

As to the facially neutral licensing scheme, the court found that Velasquez had not plausibly alleged either a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect. The complaint did not show that he was punished more harshly than similarly situated white engineers or that Black engineers generally were disciplined more often or more harshly under the licensing rules.

Sections 1981 and 1983

The court dismissed the Section 1981 claim because Velasquez had not plausibly alleged that the defendants acted with racial motivation or purposeful discrimination. The complaint did not identify a racially discriminatory purpose, similarly situated white engineers who received more lenient treatment for comparable conduct, or discriminatory animus in applying the licensing rules.

The court also dismissed the Section 1983 claim. Section 1983 can provide a remedy when a municipality’s policy, regulation, ordinance, or custom causes a constitutional or federal-law violation. Because the court found no underlying equal-protection violation, it concluded that Velasquez could not maintain the related municipal-liability claim.

State-law claims and disposition

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law. Supplemental jurisdiction is a court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. The court relied on the usual considerations of judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and respect for state courts, noting that proceedings concerning the disciplinary actions were ongoing in New York state court.

The defendants’ motion to dismiss was GRANTED. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment dismissing Count One, the equal-protection claim, and Count Three, the Sections 1981 and 1983 claims, with prejudice. Count Two, the state and city human-rights-law claims, was dismissed without prejudice. The court also deemed Velasquez’s mediation request moot and directed that the case be closed.