Johnson El v. Chambers

Background

Jeremiah Siddique Johnson El, who represented himself, sued police officers, the Town of Chester Police Department, and others. His claims arose from a March 22, 2019 traffic stop; tickets for traffic violations; the revocation of his pistol permit; information allegedly sent to the judge who revoked that permit; a police poster identifying him as a safety risk; and alleged retaliation and emotional distress.

The court treated allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and consistent allegations in Johnson El’s opposition papers as part of the pleading. Johnson El alleged that Bruce R. Chambers stopped his car, demanded identification, threatened arrest or towing, and issued tickets. He also alleged that Robert J. Bird made threatening and racially offensive statements, that the Town of Chester Police Department later circulated a poster about him, and that Bird sent information to Orange County Court Judge William J. DeProspo before the pistol permit was revoked.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court was required to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but not legal conclusions. Because Johnson El represented himself, the court read his filings liberally and considered the strongest claims reasonably suggested by them.

Traffic-stop claims

Although Johnson El labeled his first claim “fraud,” the court construed his allegations as possible claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an allegedly unlawful traffic stop and malicious prosecution. The court dismissed the unlawful-stop claim because Johnson El did not allege facts showing that Chambers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The court noted that Johnson El later admitted failing to yield, which supported the stop. The court also rejected any claim based on the length of the stop because Johnson El alleged no facts showing that the officers kept him longer than reasonably necessary.

The court dismissed the malicious-prosecution theory because the two traffic summonses did not impose a sufficient deprivation of liberty. It also held that the proceedings did not end in Johnson El’s favor: one ticket was resolved through payment of a fine for failing to yield to a pedestrian, and the other was covered by that payment. The court stated that an alternative false-arrest theory would also fail because the tickets did not amount to an arrest-like deprivation of liberty and the resulting conviction established probable cause.

Firearm-permit claims

The court construed Johnson El’s second claim as asserting procedural due process and Second Amendment claims connected to the revocation of his pistol permit. It held that the procedural due-process claim was barred by claim preclusion, a rule preventing a party from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in an earlier case after a final judgment. In a prior related proceeding, Chief Judge McMahon had dismissed a similar claim because Johnson El had not shown that an available state-court challenge was inadequate. Judge Seibel also agreed with that decision on the merits, reasoning that Judge DeProspo had given Johnson El an opportunity to be heard through multiple written submissions, even if he was unaware of the scheduled in-person hearing.

The court also rejected the distinct theory that the defendants’ investigation and allegedly false information caused a Second Amendment violation. The opinion stated that Judge DeProspo revoked the permit under New York Penal Law § 400, which bars firearm licenses for people convicted of a felony, and that Johnson El did not deny the felony conviction described in the revocation order. The court concluded that denying firearm permits to felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

Perjury claim

The court dismissed the claim that Anthony Miranda committed perjury. It held that perjury is a crime, not a private civil cause of action. The court also noted that the challenged statements were not alleged to have been made under oath and that there was no indication Bird knew information received from Miranda was false. The claim against Miranda was dismissed under the statute governing screening of claims filed by people allowed to proceed without paying filing fees.

Police-poster claims

The court treated the allegations about the poster as a possible due-process “stigma-plus” claim. Such a claim requires both a sufficiently false and reputation-damaging statement and an additional government-imposed burden or change in legal status. The court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that Johnson El had adequately alleged a false and derogatory poster, but held that he alleged only reputational harm and reactions by neighbors. That was not enough to show the required additional burden. The court dismissed this due-process claim.

The court also considered a possible First Amendment retaliation claim based on the poster appearing after Johnson El complained about Bird and Chambers. It dismissed that claim because Johnson El did not allege that the poster chilled his speech or caused concrete, measurable harm. The court stated that hurt feelings and reputational injury alone were insufficient.

Other claims and parties

The court dismissed any supervisory-liability claims against Daniel Doellinger because the underlying constitutional claims failed and a supervisor cannot be held liable merely because of a subordinate’s conduct. It dismissed alleged discrimination based on Johnson El’s asserted Moorish or indigenous status for failure to state a claim. Any claims against Judge DeProspo were dismissed based on judicial immunity and the earlier related proceeding.

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims. It dismissed those potential state-law claims without prejudice. The court also denied Johnson El’s request for a special order.

Disposition

Judge Seibel granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and directed the clerk to close the case. The court declined to grant leave to amend because Johnson El had already amended twice, had received notice of pleading deficiencies, and his proposed third amended complaint would not have cured the problems. The opinion does not expressly assign a with-prejudice or without-prejudice label to the federal dismissals generally; it specifically states that the potential state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice.