Richardson v. Buckheit

Background

Latoya Richardson, who alleged that she is a Black woman and a current employee of the City of New York, worked as the office manager for the Kings County Office of the Public Administrator. She alleged that Richard Buckheit, the Commissioner and her direct supervisor, removed or reassigned some of her responsibilities, assigned her other tasks, denied her certain workplace benefits and perks, and treated Black employees less favorably. She also alleged that Buckheit retaliated after she complained to the Equal Employment Office and others about discrimination and harassment. Her allegations included being called “Lucy,” an incident involving Buckheit standing close to her, changes to her schedule and compensation time, monitoring by an intern, work assignments, and several comments or incidents that she viewed as racist or discriminatory.

Richardson filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 13, 2019. The agency dismissed the charge, stating that the office employed fewer than the number of workers required for coverage under Title VII. Richardson then filed this case and later filed a First Amended Complaint through counsel. She asserted claims for race and sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law, as well as a state-law negligent-supervision claim.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences for Richardson.

Section 1981 claims

The court dismissed Richardson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Buckheit and the Kings County Office of the Public Administrator. It held that Section 1981 does not provide a separate damages action against state actors. The court explained that claims involving state-government violations of Section 1981 must instead proceed through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Richardson had not pleaded Section 1983 claims, and the court declined to rewrite her complaint because she was represented by counsel.

Title VII coverage and timing

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that all Title VII claims had to be dismissed because the office allegedly employed fewer than 15 people. Richardson specifically alleged that it had more than 15 employees, and the court treated that factual allegation as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court also stated that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s determination did not bind the court.

The court held that most of Richardson’s discrimination and retaliation allegations were outside Title VII’s 300-day filing period. Richardson filed her charge on March 13, 2019, so the court treated conduct occurring before May 17, 2018, as untimely for those claims. The court declined to apply the continuing-violation doctrine because Richardson alleged separate incidents rather than discrimination carried out through a specific policy or mechanism. The court treated the hostile-work-environment claim differently because such a claim can include a series of acts over time when at least one related act falls within the filing period.

Title VII discrimination claims

The court held that Richardson did not adequately allege an adverse employment action for her race- or sex-discrimination claims. An adverse employment action is a materially harmful change in the terms or conditions of employment, such as termination, demotion with reduced pay, a material loss of benefits, or significantly reduced responsibilities.

Richardson remained employed, did not allege a pay reduction, and did not allege that she sought and was denied a promotion. The court found that the timely allegation that Buckheit reassigned the task of painting the office was not materially adverse. It likewise found that the alleged loss of a larger desk, parking plaque, office and petty-cash keys, and certain tasks amounted to inconveniences or changes in duties rather than a significant reduction in responsibilities. Richardson’s allegation that she was denied overtime also was insufficient because she did not allege a resulting financial or other material harm.

Title VII retaliation claim

The court dismissed Richardson’s retaliation claim. It held that none of her retaliation allegations was timely. It also found that the complaint did not plausibly connect the alleged retaliatory actions to protected activity. In particular, Richardson alleged that her Friday lunch schedule had already changed before her first Equal Employment Office complaint, making it impossible to infer from the pleaded timeline that the change was retaliation for that complaint. Her allegations about meetings held during her lunch break were also unclear about whom she had complained to, whether that complaint was legally protected, and whether missing the meetings harmed her work or professional advancement.

Title VII hostile-work-environment claim

Although the court considered all of Richardson’s allegations for purposes of the hostile-work-environment claim, it held that she did not state a claim. The court concluded that the allegations did not plausibly connect Buckheit’s treatment of her to her race or sex. It also found that the alleged remarks and incidents were not severe or frequent enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive workplace. Even assuming that two remarks had racist implications, the court characterized them as two isolated offensive statements over four years. The allegations about lights being turned off, accusations involving missing property, and another employee’s alleged demotion also did not establish sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment.

State-law claims and disposition

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over Richardson’s claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court expressly dismissed those claims without prejudice. The opinion lists a negligent-supervision claim, but it does not separately explain that claim’s disposition.

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil granted the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case. The opinion’s conclusion refers to dismissal of claims under “Title VI,” although the discussion concerns Richardson’s Title VII claims; this appears to be an inconsistency in the opinion text.