Norman v. John Doe
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:17-cv-09174
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Norman v. John Doe, Judge Karas ordered the Clerk to seek limited volunteer counsel for Norman to oppose dismissal motions.
Norman was eligible for limited volunteer counsel to oppose the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but the order did not guarantee that an attorney would accept the representation. The defendants’ dismissal motions and the later briefing schedule were affected by the limited assignment.
What happened
Norman v. John Doe concerns Norman’s claim that prison medical-care providers delayed surgery for his injured finger, causing permanent damage. He brought the claim under a federal civil-rights law and alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
The court had already allowed Norman to proceed without paying court fees, so it found that he was financially unable to afford a lawyer. The court also found that his claim was likely substantial and that the other factors favored limited volunteer representation while the defendants’ dismissal motions were considered.
Judge Kenneth M. Karas directed the Clerk to seek volunteer counsel for the limited purpose of opposing the dismissal motions. The order did not guarantee that a lawyer would volunteer, and the representation would generally end after counsel completed Norman’s opposition unless its scope was expanded.
The detailed version
- Norman v. John Doe · No. 7:17-cv-09174
- Kenneth Karas
- Nov. 19, 2020
Background
Norman filed a Fourth Amended Complaint asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. He alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the opinion, Norman injured a finger on his right hand while playing basketball at Sing Sing Correctional Facility on January 16, 2016. He alleged that a significant delay in surgery caused permanent damage.
Norman asked for volunteer legal counsel to help oppose the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court had previously granted his request to proceed without paying court fees and therefore found that he was indigent, meaning unable to afford counsel.
Legal standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court may ask an attorney to represent a person who cannot afford counsel. In a civil case, the court cannot require an attorney to accept the representation or guarantee that counsel will be available. The court must consider whether the claim appears likely to have substance and may also consider the person’s ability to investigate facts, present the case, handle the legal issues, and address conflicting evidence.
Court’s analysis
The court found that Norman’s claim was “likely to be of substance.” It also found that the other relevant factors supported limited volunteer representation. In particular, the court concluded that counsel would significantly help Norman oppose the defendants’ motions to dismiss by clarifying the issues and helping present the arguments.
Ruling and scope of representation
The court granted Norman’s application for limited volunteer counsel and directed the Clerk of Court to attempt to locate an attorney. The requested representation was limited to opposing the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The opinion states that the motions were due December 17, 2020; Norman’s opposition was due January 31, 2021; and replies were due February 13, 2021.
Any volunteer attorney could choose to continue representing Norman at trial, but was not required to do so. Unless the court expanded the assignment, the representation would end after the attorney drafted the opposition to the motions to dismiss. The court also explained that volunteer counsel could seek reimbursement of certain out-of-pocket expenses under the court’s pro bono fund.
Judge Kenneth M. Karas ordered the Clerk to seek counsel but cautioned that no volunteer might accept the case and that a lengthy delay could occur before counsel was found.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.