Hoti v. United States
- Laura Swain
- 1:19-cv-08805
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Hoti v. United States, Judge Swain denied Xhem Hoti’s challenge to his carjacking conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Xhem Hoti, whose motion to vacate his federal carjacking conviction and sentence was denied.
What happened
In Hoti v. United States, Xhem Hoti asked the court to set aside his carjacking conviction and sentence under a federal law allowing challenges to unlawful convictions and sentences. He relied on Supreme Court decisions finding certain criminal-law provisions unconstitutionally vague.
Hoti had pleaded guilty to carjacking and received an 87-month prison sentence and three years of supervised release. The court explained that he was not convicted under the laws involved in those Supreme Court decisions and that he had not shown that the federal carjacking law was unconstitutional.
Judge Swain denied Hoti’s motion, declined to issue a certificate allowing an appeal, denied his request to appeal without paying filing fees, and directed the clerk to close the related civil case.
The detailed version
- Hoti v. United States · No. 1:19-cv-08805
- Laura Swain
- Dec. 4, 2020
Background
Xhem Hoti was charged in a criminal case with carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 and possessing, carrying, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty only to carjacking. The firearm count was not the basis of his conviction. The court sentenced him to 87 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
Hoti later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure that allows a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence imposed in violation of federal law or the Constitution. He argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, Sessions v. Dimaya, and United States v. Davis made his carjacking conviction constitutionally invalid. He filed the motion without a lawyer.
Court’s analysis
The Supreme Court held in Johnson that a residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. Dimaya reached a similar conclusion about a residual clause in the definition of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and Davis invalidated a similarly worded residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).
The court held that Hoti was not convicted under any of those statutes. Instead, he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, which applies when a person, intending to cause death or serious bodily harm, takes or attempts to take a motor vehicle from another person by force, violence, or intimidation. The court stated that Hoti had identified no authority questioning the constitutionality of § 2119 in light of Johnson, Dimaya, or Davis, and that the court had found none. It therefore concluded that § 2119 remained constitutional and that Hoti’s conviction was authorized by law.
The court also rejected Hoti’s arguments concerning 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), explaining that he was not convicted under § 924(c) and that his offense level was not increased under that statute. The court added that, even if § 924(c) had affected his sentence, courts had consistently held that § 2119 carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause.
Disposition
Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied Hoti’s § 2255 motion. The court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Hoti had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. It certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied any application to appeal without paying filing fees. The order resolved the relevant criminal-case docket entry, and the clerk was directed to close the related civil case.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.