Schmiege v. Henton

Background

Brian E. Schmiege, who was incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility and represented himself, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Deputy of Health Services Henton and Dr. Alam failed to provide adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and disclosed his medical information in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.

An earlier order dismissed the inadequate-medical-care claim and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act claim. It also left only Schmiege’s claim that Henton violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process right to medical privacy. Although the defendants’ motion to dismiss referred to both Henton and Alam, Judge Halpern noted that Alam was no longer a defendant on a remaining claim and disregarded arguments concerning Alam.

Schmiege alleged that, during medical visits, Henton discussed his medical conditions in front of other inmates and prison staff. He said that other correctional officers and nurses overheard the discussions and later victimized or harassed him. The remaining claim concerned disclosure of his neck, head, and back injuries. In his opposition brief, Schmiege also referred to prostate-cancer treatment, but that allegation was not in the Complaint.

Legal standard

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. At that stage, the court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, but it does not accept legal conclusions or unsupported statements. The court applies less demanding pleading standards to a person representing himself, while still requiring enough facts to make the claim plausible.

Analysis

The court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a person’s interest in keeping certain personal and medical information confidential, including information about the person’s body. It also stated that incarcerated people have this constitutional privacy right. But the right is not absolute, and the strength of the privacy interest depends on the medical condition involved.

The court explained that disclosure may violate the Constitution only when the condition is extremely private and intimate or likely to cause an intense desire for confidentiality together with hostility or intolerance from others. It cited HIV, AIDS, and transsexualism as examples of conditions that may receive this protection.

The court held that Schmiege’s neck, head, and back injuries were not sufficiently serious or private to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. It found that the conditions were not stigmatizing and were not likely to provoke hostility or intolerance. The court reached this conclusion even assuming, as required at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that Henton discussed the conditions publicly and others overheard.

The court also stated that, even if it considered the unpleaded allegation concerning cancer treatment, it knew of no authority establishing that cancer was the type of extremely private or stigmatizing condition protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in these circumstances. Because the court found no protected privacy interest, it did not balance that interest against the government’s interest in disclosure and did not address whether Henton was protected by qualified immunity.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the remaining Fourteenth Amendment claim and then dismissed the Complaint. It found that amendment would be futile because Schmiege could not establish that his medical conditions implicated Fourteenth Amendment protections. The court directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motion and the action and to mail Schmiege a copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order.