Gunn v. Annucci

Background

Darrell Gunn, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Anthony J. Annucci and Thomas R. Griffin. The opinion identifies Annucci as the Acting Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and Griffin as Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility. Gunn alleged that the heat at Green Haven was turned off from April 15, 2017, through May 15, 2017. He said daytime temperatures were between 40 and 45 degrees and nighttime temperatures were in the low 30s, causing pain, stiffness, depression, anxiety, lost sleep, and difficulty performing daily activities. He sought compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Rulings on jurisdiction

The court held that any claims Gunn intended to bring under New York law had to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. New York Correction Law § 24 bars damages claims under New York law against covered corrections employees for conduct within the scope of their employment and requires such claims to be brought in the New York Court of Claims. The court stated that this also prevents a federal court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

The court also dismissed Gunn’s § 1983 claims against Annucci and Griffin in their official capacities under Rule 12(b)(1). It reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment barred those claims for damages against the state officials in their official capacities. The court emphasized that this ruling did not affect Gunn’s § 1983 claims against the defendants in their individual capacities.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to complete available prison grievance procedures before bringing a federal action about prison conditions. The court described the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision process as having three steps: filing with the facility grievance committee, appealing to the superintendent, and then appealing to the Central Office Review Committee.

The court concluded that the failure to complete the grievance process was clear from the complaint and the documents properly considered with it. It therefore dismissed the remaining individual-capacity § 1983 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court also considered Gunn’s argument that a hunger strike, suicide watch, and lack of access to mail, paper, and a pen prevented exhaustion, but stated that the cited events occurred almost three weeks after the appeal deadline.

Eighth Amendment claim

The court alternatively addressed the substance of Gunn’s conditions-of-confinement claim. To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must plausibly allege both an objectively serious condition that creates an unreasonable risk of serious harm and that the defendant knew of and disregarded that risk.

The court found Gunn’s allegations about the temperature insufficient to satisfy the objective requirement. He did not specify when he was exposed to the temperatures, how long particular exposures lasted, or whether the temperature readings were from inside or outside the facility. The court also found that, even if the objective requirement had been met, Gunn did not allege that Griffin knew Gunn or other prisoners were exposed to freezing temperatures and disregarded that risk. The court therefore dismissed the conditions-of-confinement claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The court found no plausible allegation that Annucci was personally involved in turning off the heat. It concluded that Annucci’s supervisory position and Gunn’s conclusory statements about his involvement were insufficient. By contrast, a grievance document stating that the heat was turned off at the superintendent’s discretion allowed the court to infer that Griffin may have directed the action. The court nevertheless dismissed the claim against Griffin for the separate reasons described above.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice because the court found that amendment would be futile. The Clerk was directed to close the case. The court did not address the defendants’ remaining qualified-immunity argument.