Sutton v. County of Westchester Jail Department of Corrections

Background

Philip Sutton, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer John Doe, Francisco Rodriguez, Shivaun Carden, Dr. Joon Park, Dr. Raul Ulloa, Dr. Alexis Gendell, and Leandro Diaz. He alleged deliberate indifference to his safety and serious medical needs. His First Amended Complaint had previously been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, but the court allowed him to amend.

Sutton filed a Second Amended Complaint. He changed his theory from claims as a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment to claims as a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants filed two Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Sutton did not oppose the motions, even after the court extended his deadline and warned that no further extensions would be granted.

Claims Against the John Doe Defendant

Sutton added a correctional officer identified as CO Doe and asserted a failure-to-protect claim concerning an assault on July 1, 2017. The court held that the claim was barred by New York’s three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. The amendment did not relate back to the original complaint because Sutton had not named a John Doe defendant within the limitations period, and the new claim involved different conduct and a different individual. The court also stated that the allegations against CO Doe failed substantively because they did not plausibly show an actual or imminent unreasonable risk of serious harm.

Failure-to-Protect Claims

For a Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, the court explained that a pretrial detainee must plausibly allege both a substantial risk of serious harm and that the official intentionally imposed the condition or recklessly failed to take reasonable care despite knowing, or having reason to know, of an excessive risk.

The court found that Sutton’s allegations against Carden and Rodriguez were materially unchanged from his earlier pleading and failed to satisfy the objective risk requirement. As to Diaz, Sutton alleged that Diaz had approved his transfer to A-Block and that Sutton had expressed safety concerns, but Sutton did not allege a prior altercation with an attacker, a complaint to Diaz about such an altercation, or a request to Diaz for separation from an attacker. The court therefore held that the allegations did not show an actual or imminent unreasonable risk of inmate violence.

Sutton did not allege that Park, Ulloa, or Gendell were personally involved in failing to protect him. The court dismissed the failure-to-protect claims against all defendants.

Medical-Care Claims

The court applied a two-part deliberate-indifference test: the alleged medical need must be objectively serious, and the facts must support an inference that the defendant knew of the serious need and intentionally disregarded it.

The court dismissed Sutton’s claim concerning his placement in general population after the First Assault because he did not allege that the housing decision delayed or interrupted surgery, caused adverse medical effects, or increased the severity of his injuries. It also dismissed the claim concerning his placement in booking for at least 30 minutes after the Second Assault, finding that the Second Amended Complaint did not cure the deficiencies identified in the earlier order.

Sutton newly alleged that officials failed to provide Ensure, a soft-food diet, and certain medications. The court held that his complaints of hunger and dizziness, along with his allegation that his face healed slowly, did not meet the required level of serious medical risk. Sutton alleged that he received the requested soft-food diet three days after surgery, but the court found that he did not allege a sufficiently serious medical need arising from that delay. Regarding the medications, Sutton did not allege that any defendant personally denied his requests or intentionally deprived him of medication, and his allegations did not plausibly show intentional or reckless conduct. The court dismissed these medical-care claims.

Municipal Liability and State-Law Claims

The court dismissed any claim for municipal liability because Sutton had not alleged an underlying constitutional violation and had not identified a municipal policy. The court also dismissed any New York state-law claims because Sutton had not complied with New York’s notice-of-claim requirements.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss Sutton’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice because further amendment would be futile. The court denied leave to replead, directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motions, and ordered the case closed.