Knowles 1 v. United States

Background

Steven Knowles was convicted after a jury trial of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, conspiracy to distribute at least 280 grams of crack cocaine, and related firearm offenses. The charges concerned the Elm Street Wolves and the July 2009 murder of Christopher Cokley. The jury acquitted Knowles of other charges, including charges concerning the attempted murder of Jose Cruz. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment plus 35 years, and the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.

Knowles filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge an unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful sentence. He also filed a motion under Criminal Rule 33 for a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence. The opinion addresses both requests.

Sentence Challenge

Knowles raised six ineffective-assistance claims involving trial and appellate counsel. He argued that trial counsel should have made a further objection to the admission of a .357 revolver, objected to a prosecutor’s statement during closing argument, and that appellate counsel should have challenged the admission of a rap video, the closing argument, the revolver, and a four-level sentencing enhancement based on Knowles’s leadership role.

The court rejected each claim under the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Under that test, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below reasonable professional standards and that the error probably affected the result. The court found that the revolver was supported by testimony and other circumstances, that counsel’s handling of the closing argument was reasonable and caused no prejudice, and that the rap-video and firearm issues lacked a sound basis for appeal. The court also found that appellate counsel reasonably declined to challenge the leadership enhancement because the sentencing court had found ample evidence that Knowles led the Elm Street Wolves.

Knowles separately argued that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify. The court concluded that the challenged statement could reasonably be understood as an argument about a cooperating witness’s credibility rather than a comment on Knowles’s silence. The court also found that the statement was relatively unimportant in light of the other evidence and that the jury instructions clearly told jurors not to consider Knowles’s decision not to testify.

Knowles claimed that the government coerced false testimony from Jamar Manners and coerced Sharonda Glover into signing a statement. The court held that these claims were procedurally barred because Knowles had not raised them at trial or on direct appeal and had not shown a legally sufficient reason for that failure or actual innocence. The court also considered the claims on their merits and found no reasonable likelihood that the alleged false testimony affected the verdict. Manners’s affidavit was unclear and unsupported by the independent evidence, while Glover did not testify at trial and the submitted interview did not clearly establish what she was recanting.

Knowles also argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis required vacating his firearm convictions. The court agreed that Davis announced a retroactive substantive rule concerning a different firearm provision, but held that Knowles had procedurally defaulted his challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The court found that he had not shown cause for the default or actual innocence and therefore did not reach the merits of that challenge.

Motion for a New Trial

Knowles’s Rule 33 motion relied on affidavits from co-defendant Rakeem Wilson, Alexandria Jamison, Knowles, and Anna Armistead. The affidavits generally supported an alibi, including the assertion that Knowles was at his apartment with Jamison when the murder occurred and that the recovered revolver did not match the weapon shown in a video.

The court first found the motion untimely. A motion based on newly discovered evidence generally must be filed within three years, and Knowles filed his motion nearly five years after the verdict. The court found no excusable neglect because the delay was substantial, would risk prejudice to the government, and was not adequately justified. The court noted that the change or mistaken understanding of counsel did not excuse the missed deadline.

The court also denied the motion on the merits. It found that the information from Wilson, Jamison, and Armistead was known to Knowles before trial and therefore was newly available rather than newly discovered. Knowles also did not show that he and his counsel had exercised sufficient diligence to locate or present the witnesses. In addition, the affidavits would not likely have changed the verdict because the government presented substantial evidence, including cooperating-witness testimony, eyewitness testimony, photographs, ballistics evidence, and surveillance video.

Disposition

Judge Karas denied the § 2255 Petition and denied the Rule 33 Motion. The court directed the clerk to terminate both matters and close the related civil case. The court did not grant a hearing because the petition did not present specific, supported factual disputes that would entitle Knowles to relief.