Matthew v. Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts

Background

Orelma Matthew alleged that the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (TCPA), her former employer, and three former supervisors—Keith Womack, Laura Beimer, and Judith Pinchinat—discriminated against her because of her race, subjected her to a racially hostile work environment, and retaliated after she complained about unequal treatment. She asserted twelve causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and a state-law negligent-supervision theory.

Matthew alleged that Black employees were spoken to more harshly than white employees, received pay increases and bonuses less often, and were disciplined more frequently. She alleged that Womack responded dismissively to complaints about pay and working conditions, that Beimer and Pinchinat disciplined Black employees, and that Pinchinat gave Matthew a poor performance evaluation and placed her on probation. Matthew complained to human resources about race discrimination and systemic racism in June and July 2020. TCPA terminated her on July 14, 2020.

The defendants moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which address subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a legally sufficient claim. They did not seek dismissal at that time of Matthew’s Title VII retaliation claim against TCPA.

Sovereign Immunity

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment generally barred Matthew’s federal, state, and city-law claims against TCPA and against Womack, Beimer, and Pinchinat in their official capacities, except for the Title VII claims against TCPA. The court therefore dismissed the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth causes of action against TCPA and against the individual defendants in their official capacities without prejudice.

Discrimination Claims

The court denied dismissal of Matthew’s First Cause of Action, her Title VII race-discrimination claim against TCPA. Although the court found that allegations about unequal pay and discipline did not adequately describe an adverse employment action affecting Matthew, it held that her termination, together with allegations that Black employees were treated more harshly and received fewer benefits, provided the minimal support needed at the pleading stage for an inference that race partly motivated the termination.

The court dismissed Matthew’s Second and Third Causes of Action, alleging race discrimination under sections 1981 and 1983, against Womack, Beimer, and Pinchinat. The court found that Matthew had not adequately alleged that Womack’s comments caused a materially adverse change in her employment conditions, or that Beimer’s and Pinchinat’s alleged reprimands, discipline, evaluation, and probation affected those conditions sufficiently to qualify as adverse employment actions.

The court granted dismissal of the Fourth Cause of Action, Matthew’s race-discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law. Her allegations did not sufficiently connect Pinchinat’s negative evaluation and probation to race, and the allegations concerning the other individual defendants did not adequately plead an adverse employment action or discriminatory intent.

The court denied dismissal of the Fifth Cause of Action to the extent it concerned Matthew’s New York City Human Rights Law discrimination claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. That law uses a broader standard, requiring allegations that Matthew was treated less well at least partly because of discrimination. The court held that Matthew met that standard as to Womack, Beimer, and Pinchinat. The claim against TCPA and claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities were dismissed on sovereign-immunity grounds.

Hostile Work Environment Claims

The court denied dismissal of the Ninth Cause of Action, Matthew’s Title VII hostile-work-environment claim against TCPA. It held that allegations of daily belittling and insulting treatment, unequal pay, more frequent discipline of Black employees, and repeated complaints were sufficient at the pleading stage to allege an environment that was objectively and subjectively hostile because of race.

The court dismissed the Tenth Cause of Action, Matthew’s New York State Human Rights Law hostile-work-environment claim, as to TCPA, Womack, and Beimer. The allegations against Womack involved rude and dismissive comments at two events nearly a year apart, and the allegations against Beimer did not describe the disciplinary actions well enough to assess their severity. The court did not dismiss the claim against Pinchinat because the defendants had not applied the proper legal standard to allegations involving Pinchinat’s August 31, 2019 evaluation and probation.

The court denied dismissal of the Eleventh Cause of Action, Matthew’s New York City Human Rights Law hostile-work-environment claim against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, for the same reasons supporting the city-law discrimination claims. The claim against TCPA and claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities were dismissed on sovereign-immunity grounds.

Retaliation Claims

The court dismissed the Seventh Cause of Action, Matthew’s New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim, against Womack because his alleged comments and tone at two training sessions did not constitute an adverse employment action under that law. The court dismissed the retaliation claims against Beimer and Pinchinat because Matthew did not allege that either supervisor knew about her protected complaints when the alleged disciplinary actions occurred. The court also dismissed the claim against TCPA and official-capacity claims on sovereign-immunity grounds.

The court denied dismissal of the Eighth Cause of Action, Matthew’s New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim, as to Womack. It held that Womack’s alleged statement that employees could leave and find another job, made after complaints about unequal pay and working conditions, was reasonably likely to deter people from complaining again under the broader city-law standard. The court dismissed the claim against Beimer and Pinchinat because Matthew did not allege their knowledge of her protected activity, and dismissed the claim against TCPA and official-capacity claims on sovereign-immunity grounds.

Matthew’s Title VII retaliation claim against TCPA was not challenged in the motion and was not dismissed in this order.

Disposition and Amendment

The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. It dismissed the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth as to TCPA, Beimer, and Pinchinat, Tenth as to TCPA, Womack, and Beimer, and Twelfth Causes of Action without prejudice. It denied the motion as to the First, Fifth, Eighth as to Womack, Ninth, Tenth as to Pinchinat, and Eleventh Causes of Action, subject to the sovereign-immunity rulings concerning TCPA and official-capacity claims.

The court granted Matthew leave to file an amended complaint if she could cure the pleading deficiencies identified in the opinion. The clerk was directed to close the motion at Docket Number 10.